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JENNIFER MNOOKIN
and DAVID KAYE

CONFRONTING SCIENCE: EXPERT EVIDENCE AND THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE*

For most of its history, the Supreme Court had little to say about expert and scientific evidence.
Then tranquility turned to turmoil. In the closing decade of the twentieth century, a trilogy of
cases, starting with Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 1 introduced and elaborated on a
new standard for admitting scientific evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence. This
trilogy, on which much ink has been spilled over the past two decades, spelled out the need for
judges to engage in preliminary gatekeeping to determine the admissibility of expert evidence.
While the evaluative criteria by which courts were to assess scientific validity were purposefully
flexible, and trial judges were to be given substantial discretion in these judgments, these cases
both reflected and generated a sense that scientific evidence required special attention and
careful scrutiny. 2
Now, in the opening decades of a new millennium, another expert-evidence trilogy has
appeared. This new trilogy arises not from a statute but from the Constitution: it relates to the
intersection between the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and the many varieties
*
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of forensic science evidence that often provide a mainstay of prosecutors’ cases against criminal
defendants. The origins of this new trilogy date to 2004, when, in Crawford v Washington 3 the
Supreme Court substantially changed its understanding of how the Confrontation Clause applies
to hearsay evidence. Crawford was a seemingly mundane murder case that did not involve or
address expert or scientific evidence. There were no fingerprints to compare, no drugs to
identify, no DNA to analyze, and no fMRI tests to run. The sole disputed question was selfdefense. But it was inevitable that Crawford’s doctrinal framework, with its focus on the newlyemphasized category of the “testimonial,” would be applied to expert evidence and that thorny
doctrinal difficulties would emerge.
The basic questions seem, at first glance, straightforward enough. To satisfy the
Confrontation Clause, must those forensic scientists or technicians who produce inculpatory
evidence against a criminal defendant testify live, or will sworn affidavits and reports suffice? If
live testimony is required, what, if anything, can the testifying witnesses say about procedures
they did not conduct personally? If multiple analysts contribute to producing a forensic test
result, which ones must appear in court? But these questions turn out not to be so easily
answered. The Court has issued three expert-evidence-related Confrontation Clause decisions in
the past four years, and each one has generated at least as many questions as answers. Moreover,
each of these cases is marked by narrow majorities, fractious and fractured opinions, and
unsatisfying doctrinal elisions. In the most recently decided case, Williams v Illinois, 4 the court
issued a bewildering array of opinions in which majority support for admitting the evidence at
issue was awkwardly knitted together out of several incompatible doctrinal bases. The result, at
least for now, is continued anxiety and confusion over the Confrontation Clause as it applies to
forensic science evidence.
The Court’s efforts to bring clarity to this area, especially in Williams, have been
muddled by its struggle to determine precisely how to think about hearsay evidence in the
context of expert evidence and the Confrontation Clause. As every student of evidence knows—
though often imperfectly understands—evidence is considered to be hearsay only if it is
introduced for the truth of the matter asserted. The phrase is more easily remembered than
understood. What it means to introduce an item of evidence “for the truth of the matter asserted”
has confused generations of law students, lawyers, and jurists. 5 In Williams, four Justices thought
it clear that a laboratory report, which was fundamental to the testifying expert’s conclusions,
was mentioned by the expert for a purpose other than its truth. Five Justices thought it equally
obvious that it was discussed solely for its truth—but because one of them agreed on other
grounds with the other four Justices’ conclusion regarding the scope of the Confrontation Clause,
a majority of the Court deemed the testimony referencing the laboratory report to be admissible
despite the absence of the opportunity to confront the report’s author.
When it comes to understanding what “the truth of the matter asserted” means, we
believe that neither group of Justices has it quite right. Understanding what it means for
3
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something to be offered for the “truth of the matter asserted” can be complicated enough in the
general hearsay context. But in the expert evidence setting, it is even more difficult, because
courts have long been willing, sometimes to the point of absurdity, to say that information
testifying experts detail to the jury in the guise of describing the basis for their conclusions is not
introduced for its truth. On the particular facts of Williams, we maintain that notwithstanding
several Justices’ argument to the contrary, there were no plausible grounds for deeming the
evidence introduced for a purpose other than its truth. But we do recognize that in other,
relatively limited instances, expert basis evidence might legitimately be introduced for a purpose
other than its truth. Since this “not for the truth” rationale is the dominant argument offered by
the Williams Court for justifying admissibility of the expert’s articulation of the basis,
ascertaining this argument’s legitimate reach is important.
Yet precision on this doctrinal point is insufficient to provide adequate guidance and
clarity. The ongoing anxiety about how to think about expert evidence and the Confrontation
Clause exists in large part because is the Court has yet to face directly a set of larger, background
concerns. This second expert-evidence trilogy reveals significant uncertainty about how, and to
what extent, scientific evidence should be treated as special or distinct from other kinds of
evidence. While the Daubert trilogy explicitly requires special scrutiny of expert evidence, other
rules of evidence are structured to provide special privileges and deference to experts, generally
letting them, for example, rely on hearsay and other inadmissible evidence in reaching their
conclusions. 6 How do these privileges generated by other evidence rules—and, more generally,
the sense that scientific evidence sometimes deserves special treatment—fit with the
Confrontation Clause and its limits on testimonial hearsay? Is there any space for heightened
deference to experts within the Confrontation Clause framework? For Confrontation Clause
purposes, should scientific evidence be seen as just the same, structurally, as any other kind of
evidence, or are there aspects related to its mode of creation and transmission that might warrant
distinctive procedures? While we will not endeavor to answer this set of questions fully in this
essay, we argue that the Court will not be able effectively or coherently to resolve the doctrinal
issues surrounding forensic science evidence and the Confrontation Clause without tackling
these questions head-on.
More specifically, we will suggest that scientific and expert evidence might warrant some
limited special treatment, based on what we see as one of the most critical dimensions of
scientific knowledge production—that it is a is a collective, rather than an individual enterprise.
Scientific tests, research and study, from high energy physics to medical research to forensic
science procedures, are not carried out solo. This feature of science has two important
consequences: first, it means that the scientific process typically depends on a certain degree of
epistemic deference by scientists to their collaborators. Scientists and experts inevitably rely and
build on facts, data, opinions, test results, of others; they do not merely defer to the authority of
others, but they are, fundamentally, epistemically dependent on one another. It also means that
scientists are engaged in what we might call “distributed cognition”— the knowledge that is
produced is not entirely held by any one person, but stretches across a network. This reticulate
6

FRE 702 permits experts to give opinions. FRE 703 permits them to rely on inadmissible evidence “[i]f
experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion
on the subject . . . .” An amendment to this rule sought to partially close this backdoor use of hearsay. It
added the proviso that “if the facts or data would otherwise be inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion
may disclose them to the jury only if their probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion
substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.”
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reality creates significant tensions with the current Confrontation Clause framework. We suggest
that recognizing these characteristics of science should invite courts to engage in a modest form
of scientific exceptionalism within Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, through efforts to create
procedures that do respect the fundamental values of the Confrontation Clause, but also adapt
when necessary, to the epistemic structures and processes of science.
We first describe this new trilogy, focusing especially on the emerging tensions in these
cases about whether scientific evidence warrants or deserves special treatment. We then look
carefully at the “truth of the matter asserted” argument in the plurality opinion written by Justice
Alito in Williams. We argue that the plurality’s approach is ingenious but indefensible on the
facts as given. In the final section, we offer thoughts on whether there ought to be a form of
“science exceptionalism” within the Confrontation Clause—that is, to what extent, and why, a
special or distinctive understanding the clause in the context of expert evidence might be
warranted.
I. THE LABORATORY TRILOGY: MELENDEZ-DIAZ, BULLCOMING, AND WILLIAMS
In Crawford, the Supreme Court recast its approach to defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right to be “confronted with the witnesses against him.” 7 For the previous several decades, the
touchstone for assessing whether hearsay evidence implicated the Confrontation Clause was the
hearsay evidence’s reliability. If the evidence had adequate indicia of reliability—and all
“firmly-rooted” hearsay exceptions were conclusively deemed to have such indicia—then its
introduction did not violate the Clause. If an item of hearsay evidence did not fall into a “firmly
rooted” hearsay safe harbor, then it had to be excluded under the Confrontation Clause unless it
had particularized “indicia of reliability.” 8 Crawford rejected this reliability-plus-tradition
framework both on functional and on historical-originalist grounds. Functionally, the Court
deemed reliability too murky to be useful—too subjective, amorphous, and unpredictable to
provide significant operational guidance to courts or to lead to consistent admissibility
outcomes. 9 But still worse, in the Court’s view, the reliability approach did not comport with
original understandings of the boundaries of the Confrontation Clause. 10 Justice Scalia’s majority
opinion declared that the right question to be asked of hearsay statements by a nontestifying
declarant that potentially implicated the Confrontation Clause was whether they were or were not
testimonial. Were these statements, in other words, akin to, or a substitute for, in-court
testimony? If so, they generally had to be excluded, for the Constitution, the Court held, barred
the prosecution from introducing “testimonial statements of a witness who [does] not appear at
trial unless he [is] unavailable to testify, and the defendant had . . . a prior opportunity for crossexamination.” 11
This concept of the testimonial is, of course, not self-explicating. At its narrowest,
testimonial evidence might be limited to those formalized materials most similar to in-court
testimony (like affidavits, depositions, sworn confessions). At its broadest, it might include any
statements made in circumstances in which the speaker or listener would reasonably understand
7
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its possible relevance to a future criminal proceeding. The Court canvassed several formulations,
ranging from the narrow to the broad, but since the statements at issues in the case were, in the
Court’s view, testimonial under any plausible definition of the term, it elected to “leave for
another day” any “comprehensive definition” of the pivotal term that now marks the perimeter of
the Confrontation Clause. 12 Six justices joined Justice’s Scalia’s majority opinion, while Chief
Justice Rehnquist wrote a concurrence (joined by Justice O’Connor) suggesting that there was
actually no need, on either originalist or functionalist grounds, to overturn Ohio v Roberts, and
that the Court’s choice not to spell out more carefully the contours of its critical category of
“testimonial evidence” was sure to generate myriad difficulties for courts and prosecutors.
As we noted at the outset, Crawford itself did not involve expert evidence. The statement
at issue in the case was a recorded statement the defendant’s wife had made to the police—she
was unavailable to testify at trial because of the state’s rules of marital privilege. But lower
courts soon began wrestling with a lively set of issues relating to expert evidence and the
Confrontation Clause, especially with regard to often-used forensic science evidence—matters
like chemical drug testing, blood and urine analysis for alcohol or other substances, autopsy
reports, and DNA profiling. In most states, some of these forms of forensic science evidence
were often introduced via sworn certificate rather than live testimony. Did Crawford jeopardize
this routine practice? What if many years passed between a forensic test and a trial, and the
original analyst was unavailable? Could someone else then testify about those test results? More
generally, could analysts regularly testify about one another’s test results, as was frequently the
practice prior to Crawford? Did it matter whether the testifying analyst was a supervisor or
regularly conducted the kind of test at issue? And what if multiple analysts had all played some
role in the tests that led to a specific conclusion—did each and every one of them really have to
testify? If not, then whose testimony was required?
Lower courts began to work through the potential implications of Crawford in this
variety of circumstances. For the most part, they were reluctant to read Crawford as requiring
any significant changes to the preexisting methods for introducing forensic science testimony. In
the first years following the Crawford decision, most (though certainly not all) trial courts
instead endeavored to shoehorn the traditional methods for presenting forensic science testimony
into this new framework without requiring modifications. 13 They argued, for example, that
forensic science reports were exempt from the Confrontation Clause because they were business
records, because they were factual, because they were neutral, or because it was just too
impractical to require the state to produce the authors of these reports or the individuals who
conducted the testing. 14
In Melendez-Diaz v Massachusetts, 15 the first case in the laboratory trilogy, the Supreme
Court weighed in on how the Crawford framework applied to expert testimony. In this case, the
prosecution presented a state laboratory analyst’s sworn certificates asserting that plastic bags
found near the defendant contained cocaine of a certain weight. A state statute exempted such
certificates from the rule against hearsay; indeed, the vast majority of states had similar statutes

12

Id at 53–54.
For a discussion of the lower courts’ responses to forensic science evidence in the wake of Crawford,
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See generally id.
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on their books. 16 The defendant objected that although Massachusetts was free to limit or abolish
the hearsay rule, introducing these certificates without the testimony of the analyst violated the
Confrontation Clause. The basic question, therefore, was whether these certificates of analysis
were testimonial. Again writing for the majority, Justice Scalia did not find this question
difficult in the least: “There is little doubt that the documents at issue in this case fall within the
‘core class of testimonial statements.’” 17 They were, at essence, affidavits made precisely in
order to substitute for testimony. Rejecting arguments that forensic scientists should be treated
differently than other witnesses, Melendez-Diaz held that a signed, sworn piece of paper was no
substitute for the actual testimony of the government chemists who conducted the tests.
From one perspective, this holding was unsurprising. It would be difficult to devise a
coherent definition of “testimonial” that did not include sworn certificates like these. Indeed,
Justice Scalia suggested that this holding is a simple extension of Crawford, signaling to
reluctant lower courts that the Court meant for them to take its newly created category seriously
even if it did require significant modification to the methods for adducing forensic evidence.
Justice Scalia’s majority was fragile, however. Four justices dissented, arguing that
Crawford and its immediate progeny dealt with “ordinary witnesses,” not scientific and expert
evidence, and “the Court should have done the sensible thing and limited its holding to witnesses
as so defined.” 18 The dissenters, led by Justice Kennedy, and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
and Justices Breyer and Alito, emphasized that numerous analysts may all play a role in
conducting a routine chemical test for drugs, and that it would be absurd to require every one of
them to show up to testify in every case. 19
The dissent also attempted to spell out several ways in which forensic analysts differ
from “conventional” or “ordinary” witnesses. The opinion points out that at trial ordinary
witnesses relate events they observed in the past, and often these events are singular or at least
atypical, whereas forensic analysts have made, in accordance with their standard protocols, nearcontemporaneous written observations of their routinely and regularly-conducted tests. In
addition, their in-court testimony more likely derives from these written observations than from
any authentic memory of the specific test in question. Forensic analysts, the dissent suggested,
are also more removed from the crime than many ordinary fact witnesses and are thereby
unlikely to be as affected by the look-him-in-the-eye aspect of testifying in person. 20 Moreover,
in making the statements that are presumed by the majority to be testimonial, experts are
following scientific protocols rather than responding to interrogation, and they lack an overtly
adversarial or accusatory relationship to the defendant. 21
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion flatly rejected these arguments, emphasizing that it is
not obvious that “what respondent calls ‘neutral scientific testing’ is either as neutral or as
reliable as respondent suggests,” and that “Confrontation is designed to weed out not only the
fraudulent analyst, but the incompetent one as well.” 22 In this first case of the trilogy, then, we
see the outlines of a critical divide over whether scientific evidence warrants special treatment
16

For a detailed discussion of the varieties of statutes permitting forensic ipse dixit testimony via
certificate, see generally Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the Constitution, 59 Vand L Rev 475 (2006).
17
Melendez-Diaz, 557 US at 310.
18
Id at 331 (Kennedy dissenting).
19
Id at 332–35.
20
Id at 339–40.
21
Id at 345–46.
22
Id at 318–19 (Scalia).
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under the Confrontation Clause. The thrust of the dissent’s argument is less that these certificates
are not testimonial, and more that these kinds of expert evidence should be excluded from the
Confrontation Clause’s strictures both for practical reasons and because of the distinctive
qualities of science. Given the other available methods of evidentiary regulation, coupled with
the protections provided by scientific procedures themselves, “the Confrontation Clause is
simply not needed for these matters.” 23 To boil the dispute down to its basics, the dissent
believes that the Confrontation Clause’s provisos ought to apply differently to scientific
evidence; by contrast, the majority wants to treat scientific evidence in precisely the same
manner as any other kind of testimony.
While, doctrinally, Melendez-Diaz clarified that forensic science reports (at least if
sufficiently formal) 24 were testimonial, it left many questions unresolved. Two years later, in
Bullcoming v New Mexico, 25 the evidence at issue was a state laboratory report on the
defendant’s blood-alcohol concentration (BAC). This time, the prosecution had offered the live
testimony of an analyst about the report. However, because the laboratory analyst who had
actually conducted the test was on unpaid leave, the prosecution substituted another employee of
the same laboratory. The testifying witness had no involvement in the specific test or in the
preparation of the report, but he was familiar with the procedures used and had run this same test
himself in other cases. This was enough to satisfy the New Mexico Supreme Court.
Begrudgingly granting that the blood alcohol report was testimonial, 26 it deemed the absent
analyst’s role to be that of a “mere scrivener who simply transcribed the results generated by a
gas chromatograph machine.” 27 Moreover, the Court concluded that the testimony of a qualified
alternative expert from the laboratory, who could, under the rules of evidence, rely upon this
report to form his own opinion, who was knowledgeable about the testing procedure at issue, and
who was available for cross-examination, provided the defendant with a constitutionally
adequate opportunity for confrontation.
New Mexico’s Rules of Evidence, like Federal Rule of Evidence 703 (and like nearly all
state evidence rules), permit experts to rely on materials that have not been (and perhaps could
not be) admitted into evidence, when forming their own expert opinions, so long as the materials
are of a type experts in the field would reasonably rely upon in forming their opinions. 28 This is,
of course, one of the rules of evidence that treats experts as “special,” giving them distinctive
testimonial privileges that lay witnesses lack. Not only are experts expected to give opinions,
whereas opinion testimony from lay witnesses is disfavored, 29 but these opinions can be based
on a wide array of materials, even including inadmissible evidence. The underlying theory is that
within their sphere of expertise, experts should be given significant leeway to determine what to
rely upon and how much warrant it should have (just as they do when using their expertise
23

Id at 340 (Kennedy dissenting).
Justice Thomas filed a one-paragraph concurrence stating that the Confrontation Clause applies only to
formalized testimonial materials, but deeming this report sufficiently formalized to fall within its purview.
25
131 S Ct 2705 (2011).
26
Prior to Melendez-Diaz, the New Mexico Supreme Court had held that blood alcohol reports were not
testimonial. State v Dedman, 102 P3d 628 (NM 2004).
27
State v Bullcoming, 226 P3d 1, 4 (NM 2010).
28
New Mex Rule Evid 11-703 provides, “If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular
field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in
evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted.”
29
See FRE 701 and FRE 702.
24
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outside of the courtroom). The New Mexico Supreme Court reasoned that under this rule, it was
legitimate for the testifying expert to have relied upon the information contained in the report by
the absent expert. The testifying expert might not have conducted the specific test, but he knew
the procedure well, and under the evidence rules, could therefore rely on the data contained in
the absent expert’s report in shaping his conclusion.
The New Mexico court did not probe this argument very deeply. The difficulty is that it is
well established that one expert cannot simply “parrot” or serve as the mouthpiece for another,
absent expert. 30 So if the testifying expert were simply parroting the absent expert, gesturing to
Rule 703 does not suffice. 31 Moreover, under New Mexico’s rather idiosyncratic interpretation
of its own evidence rules, its version of Rule 703 does not permit an expert to rely upon the
“opinion” of another expert but extends only to “facts or data.” 32 The court endeavored to finesse
these issues by insisting that the results of the gas chromatograph machine reported by the absent
witness “do not constitute expert opinion,” but rather, are simply facts and data upon which
another expert could rely, since the absent expert was merely the “scrivener” for the machine
data. 33
The Supreme Court rejected the prosecutor’s effort to substitute a surrogate witness
unconnected to the specific test at issue for the actual forensic tester. Even if another laboratory
employee was very familiar with the testing process, the Court determined that the surrogate
could not provide the defendant with the same opportunity to probe the specifics of the test as
performed in this instance based on first-hand knowledge. Although the Court granted that the
analyst who did the testing might lack any recall of the specific test, it still thought this
distinction mattered. Presumably, the distinction is that a surrogate could not possibly have any
first-hand recall because he was not there, whereas the actual analyst could in principle have
recall, even though in practice he might frequently (and understandably, given both the routine
and frequent nature of such tests and the passage of time between test and trial) not remember.
More generally, the Court emphasized that a surrogate cannot provide the defendant with the
same opportunity to probe the actual analyst’s competence, veracity, and work habits. The point
was especially salient in Bullcoming given that the actual analyst was on administrative leave for
unknown reasons. At bottom, even a surrogate witness capable of explaining the test, the results,
and the general operation of the machine is not good enough for the Constitution: “the Clause
does not tolerate dispensing with confrontation simply because the court believes that
questioning one witness about another’s testimonial statement provides a fair enough opportunity
for cross-examination.” 34 “Fair enough” is not fair enough for the Constitution.
30

To be sure, the line between legitimately relying on information provided by others and illegitimately
serving as a mouthpiece for their conclusions is not always clear. For a case at the borderland, see Dura
Automotive Systems of Indiana Inc v CTS Corp, 284 F3d 609 (7th Cir 2002).
31
See David H. Kaye, David E. Bernstein and Jennifer L. Mnookin, The New Wigmore—A Treatise on
Evidence: Expert Evidence §§ 4.6.1(c), 4.7.1 (Aspen 2d ed 2011).
32
See State v Aragon, 225 P3d 1280 (NM 2010), cited in the State Supreme Court’s opinion in
Bullcoming. The cases cited in Aragon do not obviously support this idiosyncratic reading of Rule 703,
but that is not our concern here. We simply note that the Advisory Committee to Rule 703 explicitly
envisions the rule enabling experts to rely, at least in some circumstances, on the opinions and inferences
of others, if they otherwise meet the rule’s requirements, such as doctors relying upon the opinions of
specialists. See Advisory Committee Note, FRE 703.
33
Bullcoming, 226 P3d at 10.
34
Bullcoming v New Mexico, 131 S Ct 2705, 2716 (2011).

9

Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion also brushed aside the New Mexico Supreme Court’s
“mere scrivener” argument. The majority noted that the report contained statements that went
beyond simply reporting a machine result, including assertions (explicit or implicit) that a
prescribed protocol had been followed and that no unusual test circumstances affecting validity
were present. 35 The majority opinion simply ignored without comment the state court’s argument
that the surrogate could legitimately rely upon the absent witness’s report to inform his own
expert opinion.
Like Melendez-Diaz, Bullcoming was a 5-4 decision, and this majority was both
awkwardly cobbled together and tenuous. Only Justice Scalia joined Justice Ginsburg’s opinion
in full. Justices Kagan, Sotomayor, and Thomas joined only portions. Justice Kennedy dissented
again, expressing continued irritation with Melendez-Diaz, exasperation at its extension in this
case, and doubts about whether Crawford itself was an improvement over the Ohio v Roberts
regime. Requiring testimony of the actual analyst in a case like this was, he said, a “hollow
formality.” 36
In addition, Justice Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion highlighting just how narrow
the decision was. She succinctly laid out four still-open issues, one of which was the intersection
of the Confrontation Clause and Rule 703. 37 Citing Rule 703—hers was the only opinion to do
so—she wrote:
This is not a case in which an expert witness was asked for his independent opinion about
underlying testimonial reports that were not themselves admitted into evidence. . . . [T]he
State does not assert that [the testifying expert] offered an independent, expert opinion
about Bullcoming's blood alcohol concentration. . . . We would face a different question
if asked to determine the constitutionality of allowing an expert witness to discuss others'
testimonial statements if the testimonial statements were not themselves admitted as
evidence. 38
Soon enough, the Supreme Court faced that question. Last summer, in Williams, the
prosecution finally found a winning combination of facts. Facing a backlog of DNA samples, the
Illinois State Police laboratory (ISP) had shipped vaginal swabs and a sample of blood from a
rape victim (L.J.) to Cellmark Diagnostics, a private laboratory in Maryland. Cellmark analysts
performed a series of procedures to find certain distinctive features in semen in the swab. These
included extracting DNA from the swabs and blood, making millions of copies of identifying
fragments of the DNA (called “STR alleles”), producing graphs that indicated the lengths of the
fragments, and comparing the sets of length measurements from the blood and vaginal swabs to
infer which one came from the rapist (“mixture deconvolution”). 39 Cellmark then wrote up a
report about what they had found, and sent it back to the ISP.
35

Id at 2715.
Id at 2724 (Kennedy dissenting).
37
The others were (1) when the evidence was produced not only for future use as testimony but also for
some alternate purpose; (2) when the testifying witness was a supervisor or a reviewer who had some
degree of first-hand connection to the actual test, even if he or she was not the primary analyst; and (3)
when the State truly introduced only machine-generated results like a gas chomatograph. Id at 2722
(Sotomayor concurring).
38
Bullcoming, 131 S Ct at 2722.
39
See David H. Kaye and George Sensabaugh, Reference Guide on DNA Evidence, in Reference Manual
on Scientific Evidence 129 (National Academies 3d ed 2011).
36
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The state did not try to introduce the report submitted to the ISP into evidence. Nor did
the state call anyone from Cellmark to testify about what that laboratory had done or what results
it had found. Instead, the prosecution called a former ISP analyst named Sandra Lambatos who
had studied the report, then checked the state’s offender DNA database, and found one matching
man. She opined, in effect, that this man—Sandy Williams—was a source of DNA on the
vaginal swab that had been analyzed by Cellmark. 40
The prosecution insisted that it was introducing this witness’s references to Cellmark’s
testing only to show the basis for her own expert conclusions about the database match to
Williams. “I’m not getting at what another lab did,” the prosecutor assured the court. 41 The only
reason for the ISP analyst’s testimony, the prosecutor maintained, was to establish that she found
a match in the database. 42 However, the prosecutor actually went one step further. Despite her
representations to the court, she framed a question that referred, awkwardly, to Cellmark’s
conclusions: “Was there a computer match generated of the male DNA profile found in semen
from the vaginal swabs of [L.J.] to a male DNA profile that had been identified as having
originated from Sandy Williams?”43 To which Lambatos answered, “Yes, there was.” 44
The appellate courts in Illinois saw no problem in this maneuver. Because the report was
not formally offered for its truth, but only to provide a basis for the testifying expert’s opinion
about the source of the DNA on the swab, these courts thought the confrontation problem
evaporated. After all, they explained, Crawford explicitly noted that its exclusionary rule does
not apply when testimonial statements are introduced for some purpose other than establishing
“the truth of the matter asserted” (TMA). 45 They saw the case as equivalent to a laboratory
supervisor or director testifying to her own probability calculations based on the “bench work” of
40

See Joint Appendix, Williams v People of the State of Illinois, No 10-8505, *57-58 (filed Aug 31 2011)
("Joint Appendix") (available on Westlaw at 2011 WL 3873378):
Q In other words is the semen identified in the vaginal swabs of [L.J.] consistent with having
originated from Sandy Williams?
A Yes.
Q What is the probability of this profile occurring in the general population?
...
THE WITNESS: This profile would be expected to occur in approximately 1 in 8.7 quadrillion
black, 1 in 390 quadrillion white, or 1 in 109 quadrillion Hispanic unrelated individuals.
Q Do you know the approximate population of the world?
A Approximately 6 billion.
MR. WALSH: Objection.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MS. PETRONE: Q In your expert opinion, can you call this a match to Sandy Williams?
A Yes.
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Id at *56.
“I was referring to a computer data base without saying any more about that but after she received that
information for the data base she did her own testing based on that information.” Id.
43
Id. Before sending the samples to Cellmark, ISP staff had ascertained that semen were present in the
vaginal swab. After sending them, it took and analyzed a DNA sample from Williams in an unrelated
case. The two technicians who performed these actions testified at William’s trial.
44
Joint Appendix at *56.
45
People v Williams, 939 NE2d 268, 277 (Ill 2010) citing Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36, 59 n 9
(2004), affd Williams v Illinois, 132 S Ct 2221 (2012).
42
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other employees even when those employees do not testify—a practice that the Illinois Supreme
Court approved in 2006. 46
The prosecution’s fancy footwork in Williams stimulated four opinions—none of which
commanded a majority. A majority did vote to affirm the conviction, but not on the Illinois
courts’ no-TMA theory. The strongest support for that theory came in an opinion written by
Justice Alito. This opinion emphasized that “[i]t has long been accepted that an expert witness
may voice an opinion based on facts concerning the events at issue in a particular case even if the
expert lacks first-hand knowledge of those facts.” 47 Justice Alito also pointed out that the
prosecution could have asked the ISP analyst a hypothetical question with the content of the
Cellmark report as its premise. 48 Then he explained that Federal and Illinois Rule of Evidence
703 goes one step further: “an expert may base an opinion on facts that are ‘made known to the
expert at or before the hearing,’ but such reliance does not constitute admissible evidence of this
underlying information.” 49 The underlying information is admissible, not for its truth, but only
for “the legitimate nonhearsay purpose of illuminating the expert’s thought process.” 50 Hence, it
was fine for the analyst who had no connection to Cellmark to answer the prosecution’s question
about Cellmark’s findings.
In addition to divining this supposedly “legitimate nonhearsay purpose,” this opinion
deemed dispositive the fact that the report was not “prepared for the primary purpose of accusing
a targeted individual.” 51 Because there was as yet no suspect in the case, “the primary purpose of
the Cellmark report, viewed objectively, was not to accuse petitioner . . . .” 52 The opinion thus
sought to confine the Confrontation Clause to statements made to accuse not just someone, but
someone in particular. But Justice Alito made this argument largely in passing; it is the no-TMA
argument that receives the most attention and care, and upon which we will focus. 53 Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy and Breyer signed on, although a separate opinion by
Justice Breyer retreated slightly on the no-TMA reasoning. 54
Another foursome, led by Justice Kagan, was incredulous. “Have we not already decided
this case?,” they asked. 55 As they saw it, the witness's testimony was “functionally identical to
the ‘surrogate testimony’ that New Mexico proffered in Bullcoming, which did nothing to cure
46

Williams, 939 NE2d at 275, citing People v Sutherland, 860 NE2d 178 (Ill 2006).
Williams, 132 S Ct at 2233 (Alito) (plurality).
48
Id at 2234.
49
Id at 2235.
50
Id at 2240 (emphasis added).
51
Williams, 132 S Ct at 2243.
52
Id.
53
On the “no-accusation” theory, see Kaye, et al., Expert Evidence § 4.12.8 (Supp, 2012) (cited in note *)
(concluding that “While a focus on whether evidence is accusatory might provide a valuable lens for
exploring the . . . category of the “testimonial,” the plurality opinion in Williams does not provide enough
specificity to make the category workable, nor does it offer a satisfying defense of its definitions and
categories.”). See also note 67.
54
Justice Breyer wrote that in permitting the putative nonhearsay use, the federal and Illinois rules of
evidence are “artificial.” Id at 2246 (Breyer concurring). To ensure that the Confrontation Clause is not
read to require the presence of every technician associated with a laboratory test, he would have preferred
to rehear the case facing more directly and more broadly how the Confrontation Clause should apply to
crime laboratory reports, perhaps with an eye to overturning or modifying Bullcoming and MelendezDiaz. Williams, 132 S Ct at 2244, 2248 (Breyer concurring).
55
Williams, 132 S Ct at 2264, 2267 (Kagan dissenting).
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the problem identified in Melendez–Diaz (which, for its part, straightforwardly applied our
decision in Crawford ).” 56 These Justices scorned the theory of the Illinois courts that Cellmark’s
statements (whether or not true) were mentioned solely for the allegedly nonhearsay purpose of
helping the factfinder understand the ISP expert’s conclusions about a database match. Writing
for herself and Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, Justice Kagan called “the idea that
such ‘basis evidence’ comes in not for its truth, but only to help the factfinder evaluate an
expert's opinion ‘very weak,’ ‘factually implausible,’ ‘nonsense,’ and ‘sheer fiction.’” 57
Justice Thomas agreed with these Justices that the no-TMA theory was implausible and
the “targeted individual” requirement groundless. “There is,” he wrote in a separate opinion, “no
meaningful distinction between disclosing an out-of-court statement so that the factfinder may
evaluate the expert's opinion and disclosing that statement for its truth.” 58 Nevertheless, he added
his vote to those of the Alito plurality “solely because Cellmark’s statements lacked the requisite
‘formality and solemnity’ to be considered ‘testimonial’ for purposes of the Confrontation
Clause.” 59 So at the end of the day, there were three arguments in support of the holding: (1)
that the statements were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted; (2) that the statements
were insufficiently formalized to count as testimonial; and (3) that the statements were not
accusatory. But not one of them mustered a majority; and they push in different directions in
terms of what statements ought to be excluded as testimonial.
It is also worth noting that in Williams, it was Justice Breyer who was most explicitly
arguing for a form of science exceptionalism under the Confrontation Clause, in terms similar to
those offered by Justice Kennedy in Melendez-Diaz. Justice Breyer noted that “the need for
cross-examination is considerably diminished when the out of court statement was made by an
accredited laboratory employee operating at a remove from the investigation in the ordinary
course of professional work,” because “alternative features of such situations help to guarantee
its accuracy,” like professional guidelines, standards, and documentations norms. 60 Crossexamination of the actual expert is a less effective check on accuracy, in his view, then the
structural mechanisms operating within science itself—though, to be sure, in Crawford and
Melendez-Diaz, the majority opinions made clear that reliability was not to be understood as
either the purpose or the lodestar of the Confrontation Clause.
This overview of the new trilogy has endeavored to describe the development of the
Confrontation Clause as it affects laboratory reports and to show how the lurking question of
science exceptionalism has made these cases difficult to resolve. One set of Justices has been
prepared to apply the logic of Crawford across all kinds of witnesses equally, seeing no
justification for carving out a different approach to forensic science. They emphasize that
reliability is not a substitute for confrontation— and after all, a turn away from reliability was the
key contribution of Crawford—and also point out that forensic science is far from foolproof and
cannot simply be presumed reliable. Another group of Justices cannot fathom that a laboratory
56

Id.
Id at 2269 (quoting Kaye, et al, Expert Evidence § 4.10.1, at 196–97 (cited in note 31); id § 4.11.6, at 24
(Supp. 2012)).
58
Id at 2255, 2257 (Thomas concurring). Justice Thomas added that “[t]o use the inadmissible
information in evaluating the expert's testimony, the jury must make a preliminary judgment about
whether this information is true.” Id (quoting Kaye, et al, Expert Evidence § 4.10.1, at 196 (cited in note
31)).
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Id at 2255 (Breyer concurring).
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Id at 2250.
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technician, doing his ordinary, routine job guided by standard operating procedures and
protocols, who has probably never seen the defendant and, unless he testifies, in all likelihood
never will, belongs in the same analytic box under the Confrontation Clause as someone making
a statement to the police or undergoing interrogation.
From a certain point of view, Justice Alito’s no-TMA argument is remarkably clever. A
strong but plausible version of the no-TMA argument would provide a way for experts formally
to remain subject to the Confrontation Clause’s strictures just like any other witnesses, but
practically speaking, it would permit prosecutors a good deal of flexibility. If a testifying expert
can rely upon—and even disclose, albeit (allegedly) not for its truth—a testimonial report by a
nontestifying expert, then the Court would be building a certain degree of scientific
exceptionalism into the Confrontation Clause through Rule 703. Rather than exempting
scientific experts wholesale, as the dissent in Melendez-Diaz seemed to desire, it would use the
existing evidence rules to ensure that practically speaking, the Confrontation Clause had little
bite. 61
It is therefore worth considering carefully the competing arguments regarding the noTMA theory. 62 We show that in the setting of Williams, the theory is ultimately implausible but
that in other settings, it could have more traction. Rule 703, properly understood, should be
neither the open ticket to admission that some state courts have been buying 63 nor the simple
formalism depicted in the plurality opinion in Williams. We begin the next section by briefly
asking why the Confrontation Clause only applies to statements introduced for their truth. We
then consider two explanations for why the statements in Williams were offered for their truth.
Both explanations appear in the opinions of Justices Thomas and Kagan in Williams, but they are
intertwined. Untangling them helps show why the no-TMA theory fails in Williams but might
succeed elsewhere. Finally, we briefly discuss the future of laboratory reports under the
Confrontation Clause.
II. WILLIAMS, RULE 703, AND THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER ASSERTED
In Williams, the entire Court assumed that TMA is an essential element of the right to
confrontation. But not a single opinion in Williams—or Crawford, in which the Court slipped the
thought inside a single parenthetical sentence inside a footnote—explains why. 64 The most
plausible answer stems from the perception of Justice Alito’s plurality that an accuser is central
to the clause. As Justice Scalia wrote in Coy v Iowa, 65 the clause encapsulates the image painted
61

On the dangers of “stealth” testimonial hearsay under Rule 703, see generally Julie A. Seaman,
Triangulating Testimonial Hearsay: The Constitutional Boundaries of Expert Opinion Testimony, 96
Georgetown L J 827 (2008).
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For a related, but broader treatment of the many theories in the case, see Kaye, et al, Expert Evidence §
4.12 (Supp. 2013) (cited in note 31).
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Pendergrass v State, 913 NE 2d 703 (Ind. 2009); State v Crager, 879 NE 2d 745, 758 (Ohio 2007).
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Crawford, 541 US at 59 n 9.
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487 US 1012 (1988). In Coy the trial court used a screen to block a man charged with sexually
assaulting two thirteen-year-old girls from the sight of the girls as they testified. Justice Scalia wrote for
the majority of the Court in holding that the barrier violated defendant’s right to face-to-face
confrontation. In Maryland v Craig, 497 US 836 (1990), the Court retreated from Coy’s seemingly per se
rule requiring face-to-face confrontation. Justice O'Connor wrote for the majority, ruling that the
Confrontation Clause merely embodies a "preference" for face-to-face, in-person confrontation, which
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by Shakespeare “when he had Richard the Second say: ‘Then call them to our presence─face to
face, and frowning brow to brow, ourselves will hear the accuser and the accused freely
speak.’” 66 With this animating principle in mind, the domain of the Clause should be confined to
statements that are not merely testimonial but also accusatorial. 67 A statement may have been
intended to accuse someone of criminal misconduct, but if it is not being used that way at trial,
then there is no accuser who needs to be confronted. More generally, if the prosecutor is not
asking the factfinder to credit the out of court statement, to consider it to be true, then the
veracity, the perceptual abilities, and the memory of the out-of-court speaker are irrelevant, or at
least a good deal less important. 68 Therefore, whether the statement of the absent “accuser” is
introduced for its truth should matter. Indeed in Williams, while the Justices attacked each
others’ positions on whether the evidence was TMA with vehemence and vitriol, 69 that the
Confrontation Clause applied only to evidence offered for its truth was simply taken for granted
by all sides.
A. IF NOT TRUTH, THEN WHAT?

Before turning to the specific forms of argument Justice Alito’s plurality opinion offers in
defense of its no-TMA position, it is worth noting there is nothing novel about the general
argument that expert basis evidence is not offered for the truth of its contents. In fact, well
before this set of Crawford-derived conundrums arose, many lower courts had taken an acrossthe-board position that an expert’s disclosure of such evidence to the factfinder is not for the
truth of its contents, but rather for the limited, nontruth purpose of helping the factfinder evaluate
the adequacy of the expert’s basis evidence by illuminating the expert’s thought process. 70
According to this argument, the purpose of telling the factfinder about the materials, data, or
opinions upon which the expert has relied is not to have the factfinder accept any of this
underlying material as true, but merely to assist the factfinder in assessing the credibility of the
expert. The theory is that the factfinder can assess whether the expert has an adequate basis for
the conclusions offered without substantively assessing whether this basis is actually true.
The difficulty with this argument is that to evaluate meaningfully the adequacy of the
expert’s basis, the factfinder—let us assume a jury, but the point applies equally to bench trials—
may be limited to satisfy sufficiently important interests. Applying this balancing test, the Court held that
the Confrontation Clause did not bar the use of one-way closed-circuit television to present testimony by
an alleged child sex abuse victim when the trial court found that the child was reportedly unable to testify
in the physical presence of the defendant due to severe emotional trauma.
66
Id at 1016.
67
Following Crawford, but prior to Melendez-Diaz, numerous courts attempted to bracket some or all
forensic science evidence as nontestimonial with the notion that the Confrontation Clause applied only to
accusatorial evidence. See Mnookin, 15 J L & Pol at 847–50 (cited in note 13); Robert P. Mosteller,
“Testimonial” and the Formalistic Definition—The Case for an “Accusatorial” Fix, 20 Crim Just 14
(Summer 2005). The Williams plurality tried to revive this notion, but with an uncomfortably cramped
conception of what makes a statement accusatorial.
68
For the classic analysis of the “hearsay” dangers and an explanation for why hearsay is limited to TMA,
see Lawrence H. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 Harv L Rev 957 (1974).
69
Justice Alito’s plurality opinion condemns the reasoning of the dissent as “truly remarkable,” 132 S Ct
at 2237, and “a very clear error.” Id at 2239 (Alito) (plurality). Justice Kagan’s dissent derides the
plurality’s at exposition as “a simple abdication to state-law labels” and “a neat trick—but really, what a
way to run a criminal justice system.” Id at 2272 (Kagan dissenting).
70
For a detailed look at this issue, see Mnookin, 15 J L & Pol at 811–27 (cited in note 13).
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must usually make a preliminary judgment about whether the information upon which the expert
has relied is true. Much of the time, if the jury believes the expert’s basis is true, it will also
believe that the expert’s reliance upon the basis is justified; conversely, if it doubts the truth of
the expert’s basis, it will likely doubt the legitimacy of the expert’s reliance. But there are some
situations in which one might be able to use the expert’s basis evidence for credibility purposes
without making a judgment about its truth. If the jury believes that the expert’s basis evidence,
even if true, is inadequate to support the expert’s conclusions, then disclosure can assist the jury
without necessitating a preliminary determination of the truth of that basis evidence. Or if other
evidence in the record establishes the truth of the basis evidence, then the jury need not rely on
the expert’s disclosure in order to evaluate the adequacy of the basis evidence as grounds for the
expert’s conclusion. (We will come back to this point below.) Most of the time, however, it is
simply not plausible to imagine that a factfinder, even a judge, can assess whether the expert’s
basis is adequate to support the expert’s conclusion without also assessing—or, perhaps more
accurately, often simply assuming—that basis’s truth. Doing so would require reasoning like the
following:
I am being asked whether the expert’s basis is adequate to support his conclusion. I
believe that the basis evidence detailed by the expert does, in theory, provide enough
good grounds to support his conclusion, if the basis is itself accurate. However, I cannot
consider the disclosure by the expert as proof of the basis’s accuracy, because I cannot
consider the basis evidence to be offered for the truth of the matter asserted. So all I can
do is say that if the basis evidence were true, it would provide an adequate basis for the
expert. I also know that the expert himself has relied on this basis—that is why it is
being disclosed to me. Hence, the expert himself believes that the basis evidence is
worth relying upon, and indeed, is true. But I cannot consider it to be true just because he
does—that would still be taking its disclosure to me as helping to establish its truth, and I
am prohibited from doing that. I am permitted, however, to defer to his conclusion, and
the fact that he has relied upon a basis that would, if true, warrant his conclusion
contributes to my willingness to believe his opinion is warranted. Still, I have no
opinion—because I have no admissible evidence upon which to ground an opinion—
about whether the basis evidence is actually true.
Granted, this inferential chain is logically possible. But it is incredibly formalistic and
wildly implausible as a matter of human reasoning. 71 Even if jurors are given limiting
instructions, it is hard to believe that they will not take the expert disclosure (and the fact of
expert reliance) as providing some degree of evidentiary support for the basis itself. Nor is it
plausible to believe that judges could altogether avoid doing so either. The notion that
factfinders will not consider the truth of the basis evidence when assessing the credibility of the
expert who has relied on this evidence is, quite simply, a legal fiction.
Prior to Crawford, the not-for-the-truth argument solved an otherwise awkward problem
for the courts. Rule 703 permits both reliance, and to some extent, disclosure of otherwise
inadmissible evidence—usually hearsay. But what was the status of this inadmissible evidence?
Rule 703 does not present itself as an exception to the hearsay rule. Certainly, it is not one of the
many exceptions enumerated in Rules 803 and 804. 72 Moreover, if experts’ disclosures were
71
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permitted for the truth of their contents, it could lead to parties’ funneling substantial quantities
of otherwise inadmissible evidence in through their experts. 73 By attributing a nontruth purpose
to the basis evidence, courts reduced the incentive for such funneling, for the matters disclosed
by experts, being substantively inadmissible, could not help establish the sufficiency of any
element and could not be advanced as true in a closing argument.
In addition, then as now, a nontruth purpose avoided thorny Confrontation Clause issues.
Since Rule 703 is not, formally, a hearsay exception at all and is of rather recent vintage, it could
not be considered a firmly-rooted hearsay exception. So if Rule 703 disclosures in the Roberts
reliability era were made for their truth, then courts would have had to determine particularized
indicia of reliability in every case. Given how little import the Confrontation Clause had in
general in this period with respect to hearsay, for it to apply so strictly in the expert context
seemed anomalous. Experts were only supposed to be able to rely upon materials “of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field,” 74 and at least arguably, this in
conjunction with other rules regulating experts provided as much structural assurance for the
reliability of an expert’s basis as exists for many hearsay exceptions. In addition, much expert
basis evidence could, in fact, be admissible with a little bit of rigmarole. Rule 703 therefore often
operated as a shortcut to disclosure, rather than as a rule permitting disclosure of materials that
were actually barred. Overall, then, prior to Crawford, the notion that such evidence was
introduced for the allegedly nonhearsay purpose of helping the factfinder better understand and
evaluate the expert’s reasoning may have been a legal fiction, but it was a legal fiction that was
largely of a piece with the broader approach to the Confrontation Clause.
Crawford and its progeny brought about three changes relevant to what we might term
the Rule 703 compromise. First, reliability was no longer the critical conceptual category for
determining the applicability of the Confrontation Clause—so if the Rule 703 compromise was
implicitly predicated upon a sense that expert evidence had structural protections for reliability
equivalent to firmly-rooted hearsay exceptions, this theory of reliability no longer made a
difference. Second, the Crawford line of cases substantially expanded the Confrontation Clause’s
power and reach. Hence, if the Rule 703 compromise stemmed from a reluctance to apply the
Clause forcefully to expert basis evidence given how little wingspan it had elsewhere, well, its
wingspan had significantly expanded. Third, prior to Crawford, the dominant reason for expert
basis evidence inadmissibility was that it was hearsay. It was inadmissible because of a rule of
evidence, not because of the Constitution.
It is certainly not obvious that Rule 703 should apply in the same way when the reason
for the basis evidence’s inadmissibility is a constitutional protection. As we have seen, using the
information strictly for a purpose other than its truth usually demands a mental dexterity to
which human factfinders can only aspire. The rules of evidence ask them to try their best. When
jurors are involved, the judge must caution the jury against relying on the basis statements for
their truth, but there is little reason to believe this will be effective. When a judge is the
factfinder, we may hope that professional exposure to the nuances of hearsay law will permit the
73
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judge to compartmentalize his thinking, but even this may be unrealistic. 75 We hope for the best
(and tolerate the worst) because expert opinions (even when based partly on hearsay) are thought
to have enough value to justify their admission. Nevertheless, even though we tolerate the Rule
703 compromise when basis evidence is not testimonial, it is not clear we should rely on pious
hopes to safeguard a constitutional right.
In the years following Crawford, a few courts began to recognize the fictional quality of
the not-for-the truth argument and therefore began to disallow disclosure of expert basis
evidence when it consisted of seemingly testimonial statements from declarants not produced for
cross-examination. 76 But many courts chose instead to adhere mechanically to the Rule 703
compromise, and concluded, often with virtually no analysis, that experts can disclose what
otherwise would be testimonial statements as mere basis evidence so long as it meets the
requirements of Rule 703 (and, for some courts, so long as the testifying expert is doing
something beyond mere parroting of the absent expert’s concusions). These courts—including
the Illinois courts in Williams—reasoned that this disclosure does not implicate the
Confrontation Clause since the evidence technically was not being offered for its truth. 77
1. “Illumination” as a Nontruth Purpose in Williams
This, then, was the lay of the land that the Supreme Court confronted in Williams. Justice
Alito’s plurality opinion accepts the broad pre-Crawford Rule 703 theory that basis evidence can
be used for the non-substantive purpose of helping the judge or jury understand and evaluate the
expert’s opinions—while suspending all judgment on the truth of the basis evidence. Presuming
that the trial judge followed the formal logic of Rule 703, the plurality maintained that the trial
judge decided that Cellmark correctly characterized the DNA in the samples not because
Cellmark prepared a report saying as much, but because of “circumstantial evidence.” 78 This
evidence included the ISP’s repeated assurances that the Cellmark lab was accredited, the fact
that the ISP often used the outside lab to cope with its backlog, and that the victim implicitly
confirmed the DNA match by picking a man with the same DNA type from a lineup. 79
The majority of the Justices—four of them in the dissent penned by Justice Kagan and
one more in the concurring opinion of Justice Thomas—found this construction of the trial
court’s reasoning unpersuasive at best. Most human beings, we have suggested, do not reason in
so well-compartmentalized a manner, and the majority of the Court adopted the realist position
75
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that Rule 703 basis evidence is likely to be used for its truth regardless of the formal logic that
undergirds the rule. In response, the plurality indignantly dismissed the dissent’s legal realism as
constituting “a profound lack of respect for the acumen of the trial judge.” 80
However, speculation or presumptions about how the trial judge reasoned are immaterial
to a narrower argument against the formal logic of Rule 703 in this setting. The argument is not
necessarily that the psychology of Rule 703 is grossly unrealistic (though it may well be). It is
that in this particular case, disclosure of Cellmark’s role cannot be seen as serving “the legitimate
nonhearsay purpose of illuminating the expert’s thought process.” 81 This, we believe, is the
dominant, and stronger, strain of the Kagan-Thomas critique. It involves several subtleties that
can be missed in the rapid-fire volleys back and forth in the Williams opinions. Consequently, we
will explicate it some detail. We begin with Justice Alito’s description of the expert’s testimony:
She testified to the truth of the following matters: Cellmark was an accredited lab; the
ISP occasionally sent forensic samples to Cellmark for DNA testing; according to
shipping manifests admitted into evidence, the ISP lab sent vaginal swabs taken from the
victim to Cellmark and later received those swabs back from Cellmark; and, finally, the
Cellmark DNA profile matched a profile produced by the ISP lab from a sample of
petitioner’s blood. Lambatos had personal knowledge of all these matters, and therefore
none of this testimony infringed petitioner’s confrontation right.
Lambatos did not testify to the truth of any other matter concerning Cellmark. She
made no reference to the Cellmark report, which was not admitted into evidence and was
not seen by the trier of fact. Nor did she testify to anything that was done at the Cellmark
lab, and she did not vouch for the quality of Cellmark’s work. 82
In this inventory of statements, one critical piece is missing, or at least passed over too
quickly. Cellmark did not simply send back swabs to the ISP. It also sent back graphs and a
table of DNA alleles it claimed to have generated from the semen found on those swabs. 83 The
ISP analyst testified that she relied on the graphs and the table from Cellmark—what Justice
Alito calls “the Cellmark DNA profile” —to reach her own conclusion that the samples sent to
Cellmark and the one taken from Williams matched. 84 In addition, Ms. Lambatos implicitly but
clearly offered a related opinion—that the information she received from Cellmark was
trustworthy.
Although Justice Alito asserts that Lambatos did not vouch for the accuracy or quality of
Cellmark’s work, this depends on exactly what is meant by the word “vouch.” She did not
“vouch” for its accuracy based on personal involvement in the testing, for she acknowledged on
cross-examination that she had nothing to do with that testing. But she clearly indicated that she
trusted the outside laboratory to do reliable work, given its accredited status, its repeated work
80
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for the state, and, of course, her willingness to act on the information. 85 Her testimony made
clear both that she had relied upon Cellmark’s information, and, that in her expert judgment, it
was worthy of reliance.
Examined carefully, the record reveals not one, but three opinions offered by the expert
about the DNA Cellmark provided to the ISP. Opinion 1 is that Cellmark’s information
attributing certain alleles to the semen found in L.J.’s vaginal swab is probably accurate. Opinion
2 is that those alleles match the defendant. Opinion 3 is that in all probability, they match no one
else. Combining all these opinions produces a chain of reasoning culminating in the conclusion
that Sandy Williams is the source of the semen. Only Opinion 1 poses a possible confrontation
problem in the case because it is only here that the state’s analyst relied on the work of another
laboratory that was not presented by a witness who could be meaningfully cross-examined about
that work.
Justice Alito endeavored to isolate and defang Opinion 1 by an analogy to a hypothetical
question. According to the analogy, Cellmark’s statements are a mere premise to the analyst’s
testimony, to be established by other evidence. If other evidence persuasively suggests that
Cellmark’s analysis is reliable, then it would be perfectly permissible to ask an expert a
hypothetical question that assumed this other evidence as true. In other words, Justice Alito
treated the expert’s testimony as if she had testified “If I were to assume that the DNA profile of
the semen is that given in Cellmark’s report and then combine that assumed fact with my
findings that this set of alleles is virtually unique and matches the alleles of Williams recorded in
the database, then I would conclude that the semen came from Williams.” This we may call
“premise-only” testimony, for the only role that Opinion 1 plays is that of the premise in the
reasoning that attributes the semen to Williams. 86
Construing Lambatos’ testimony as premise-only testimony is vital to the plurality’s noTMA theory because it makes it possible for the plurality at least to argue that the trial court did
not rely on the analyst’s beliefs about the quality of Cellmark’s work. If other evidence
supported a belief in the reliability of Cellmark’s analysis, then crediting the judge with
following Rule 703’s strictures not to consider the truth of the basis evidence is at least plausible.
However, the premise-only view of the testimony necessarily defeats the Rule 703 argument.
Lambatos undertook what the prosecution called “her own testing” 87 and what the trial court
called her “own independent testing of the data received” 88 only with regard to Opinions 2 and 3.
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For example, on cross-examination defense counsel asked, “You did not know if they observed or
checked the calibration of their instruments—correct?” Lambatos replied: “Well, [Cellmark] Diagnostic is
an accredited laboratory so they would have to meet certain guidelines to perform DNA analysis for the
Illinois State police and so all those calibrations and internal proficiencies and controls would have had to
have been in place for them to perform the DNA analysis.” Joint Appendix at 59–60.
86
However, this case does not fit comfortably into the premise-only mold. We give an example of true
premise-only testimony in the final section.
87
See note 42.
88
The trial court admitted what it understood to be the ISP analyst’s “own independent testing of the data
received from [Cellmark].” Joint Appendix at 93–94. At most, this means that she not only input the
Cellmark numbers and found a database match to Williams, but that she also inspected the graphs to
verify that the numbers that Cellmark attributed to the male part of the DNA mixture were those for DNA
fragments within the DNA profile of someone other than L.J. Her views on the deconvolution of the
mixture might have been admissible, but the prosecution did not ask about her thought process for
mixture interpretation. It asked for her opinion on a match in the database. See text accompanying notes
41–42.

20

Under the theory for which her testimony was offered, Rule 703 would allow her to disclose the
origin of the alleles she input into the computer—but only insofar as this information could
affect the soundness of those opinions, and the Opinion 1 premise had no effect on those
independent opinions. That is, Cellmark’s work neither enhanced nor diminished the likely
accuracy of her testimony that the computer found a match to the alleles she input and that this
set of alleles was rare in the population (Opinions 2 and 3). Knowing that Cellmark fed her
certain graphs and numbers explains why she typed those particular numbers, but this why sheds
no light on the quality of the conclusion that William’s database profile corresponds to the
profile she input for her database query. It does nothing to illuminate how a computer makes a
match, how the matching database record is linked to Sandy Williams, or how rare the matching
features are in the population. And eliciting this latter set of explanations was the only ground
the prosecution gave for calling the ISP analyst to the stand. 89 Recall that the prosecution insisted
“I’m not getting at what another lab did,” but only asking the analyst about her own testing based
on [DNA] information from Cellmark.” 90 Under this quite delimited theory of what the
testimony was provided for, disclosing her belief about the source of the DNA she analyzed
simply does not illuminate her thought process vis-à-vis the methods of her own testing.
Under a less cramped theory of the purpose of the evidence, the ISP analyst’s disclosure
of Opinion 1 could indeed illuminate her thought process—but then, it would be running through
a truth inference. As we have noted, Rule 703 permits experts to rely upon inadmissible evidence
so long as it is of a kind that experts in the field would reasonably rely. It is probably reasonable
for experts to rely on DNA analyses conducted by other accredited laboratories. So putting the
Confrontation Clause to one side, under Rule 703, there would most likely be nothing
impermissible about the ISP expert testifying to her ultimate conclusion that the DNA found in
the vaginal swab matched the defendant, notwithstanding that this conclusion required reliance
upon the accuracy of Cellmark’s report. 91 But notice: to reach that ultimate conclusion, the ISP
analyst had to accept the truth of Cellmark’s report. There is nothing wrong with a scientist
engaging in that kind of epistemic deference to the findings of other trusted experts. The point is
simply that the inferential chain for that ultimate conclusion necessarily runs through the truth of
Cellmark’s report. We see, then, that disclosing Opinion 1 to the jury neither strengthens nor
weakens the expert’s testimony with regard to Opinions 2 and 3. So Opinion 1 illuminates her
thought process only insofar as it reveals that she also believes Opinion 1, and that belief
undergirds her opinion that Williams’ DNA was found in the vaginal swabs from the victim.
It is also worth noting that although Cellmark’s findings revealed nothing about the
quality of the ISP analyst’s admissible conclusion that the alleles used in her database query
produced a match to a profile with a negligible random-match probability (Opinions 2 and 3),
there was a valid reason for the state to disclose the fact that Cellmark attributed the alleles to
semen from Williams. Without some explanation of why Lambatos input the numbers she did,
her actions are barely intelligible and would lack relevance. Evidence of this sort certainly can be
admissible to complete the prosecution’s story. 92 But this source of illumination has no bearing
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on the hearsay issue in Williams. It pertains to relevance, and relevance does not provide a way
around the argument that the evidence is testimonial unless the evidence is legitimately offered
for a non-TMA purpose. Evidence of prior criminal conduct, for example, sometimes is required
for narrative integrity. When this occurs, the evidence is relevant for a purpose other than
indicating a propensity to commit crimes, which helps overcome an objection to character
evidence. 93 Even in that situation, however, the background evidence is still introduced for its
truth. If the proof of the missing part of the narrative is false, then the evidence has no probative
value. 94
The notion that an assertion that has no probative value when it is false supplies a
heuristic with which to test any argument about TMA. We simply ask whether the factfinder
would have any use for the out-of-court statements if their truth value were altered. Consider
Tennessee v Street. 95 The Crawford Court cited Street as establishing that only statements
introduced for their truth can offend the Confrontation Clause, 96 but the no-TMA majority in
Williams easily distinguished the statements in Street from those in Williams. As Justice Thomas
explained, in Street
the defendant testified that he gave a false confession because police coerced him into
parroting his accomplice's confession. On rebuttal, the prosecution introduced the
accomplice’s confession to demonstrate to the jury the ways in which the two confessions
differed. Finding no Confrontation Clause problem, this Court held that the accomplice's
out-of-court confession was not introduced for its truth, but only to impeach the
defendant's version of events. 97
This reasoning is correct because in Street, even if we flip the truth value of the accomplice’s
confession, it still proves the prosecution’s point—that the defendant was not coerced into saying
the same thing as the accomplice. If the two confessions are the same, it provides some element
of support for the defendant’s claim. If they are substantially different, it weakens his
argument—and this is true whether the accomplice’s confession is entirely true, entirely false, or
somewhere in between.
This invariance under an inversion in the truth value exists in some expert opinion cases
as well. Consider Weber v BNSF Railway Co. 98 A train engineer felt ill after he was stuck in a
tunnel with fumes from other locomotives. The treating physician testified that the employee had
brain damage from acute carbon monoxide poisoning. Not only was that his initial diagnosis, but
crime should be admissible on the ground that “[p]eople who hear a story interrupted by gaps of
abstraction may be puzzled at the missing chapters.”).
93
1 McCormick § 190 (cited in note 92).
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he referred the patient to a neurologist who conducted a PET scan and reported to his primary
physician that the scan indicated carbon monoxide poisoning. In Weber, one can at least argue
that the physician's testimony that he had the neurologist do a PET scan is admissible
independently of the truth of the neurologist’s inferences—because it shows how thorough the
physician was in making his diagnosis. Even if the PET scan had been inconclusive, the
physician might have been able to defend his diagnosis (and show that he did everything he was
supposed to do to make the diagnosis, so that his opinion should be believed). The nonhearsay
logic would be that his care and conscientiousness in bringing in a neurologist revealed his
thoroughness in gathering information for his diagnosis and in using all the data, including
information from his examination of the patient and other sources independent of the neurologist.
In an alternative world in which the physician made his conclusion about carbon monoxide
poisoning with an inconclusive PET scan, the conclusion would not as strong as the one
supported by the PET scan, but the disclosure of the inconclusive PET scan still would have
relevance apart from its truth. Thus, changing the truth value of the neurologist’s out-of-court
statement about the PET scan affects only the weight the factfinder should accord the testifying
physician's conclusion. If the physician's testimony with the weaker foundation is the only
evidence of carbon monoxide poisoning, then a factfinder still might be able to credit it, and if
so, the plaintiff's case should withstand a motion for a directed verdict. To be sure, in cases like
this one, there might be a concern that the factfinder would take the corroborating PET scan as
true, but at least there is a logical basis for arguing that the evidence would remain relevant even
with a different conclusion, and hence it is not introduced solely for its truth.
The same nontruth reasoning does not work in Williams. If the prosecution wants the
expert to give the limited opinion ostensibly desired in Williams—namely, that Williams is the
only person whose DNA profile matches the alleles the analyst considered—then the prosecution
has the previous problem of explaining how the expert’s report that the alleles came from an
unrelated laboratory that tested certain samples illuminates the thought process of going from
those numbers to that conclusion. For that expert thought process, the Rule 703 rationale is
inapposite. The analyst’s reasoning that a set of numbers triggered a unique database match is
neither stronger nor weaker depending on the source of the numbers. Had the numbers come to
the analyst in a dream, or had she found them scrawled on her desk in an anonymous note, her
reasoning from them to Sandy Williams would have been the same.
To make the situation analogous to Weber (and more like the hypothetical question
envisioned in the plurality opinion), we must envision the analyst providing a different opinion.
Suppose that the prosecutor in Williams had explained that her purpose in calling the ISP analyst
was to have this expert opine not just that she found a database match to Williams, but also that
some of the DNA on the swab came from Williams. Like the diagnosis of the physician in Weber,
the DNA analyst’s opinion then would rest on her own work (in the database matching and
evaluation step) and on the preceding expert’s information (in the prior step characterizing the
rapist’s DNA). Suppose that the court allows the expert to refer to Cellmark’s testing solely to
show the quality or nature of her reasoning from Cellmark’s report to the revised conclusion that
Williams is the source of the rapist’s semen (what we designed as Opinions 2 and 3).
Now notice what happens when we change the truth content of the Cellmark’s report
from “true” to “inconclusive.” The prosecution can hardly argue that relying on the statements in
that report to initiate a database search makes the final conclusion about Williams any more
believable than if the expert used the dream sequence of numbers. This is unlike the consultation
with the neurologist in Weber, which could have supported the diagnosis even if the neurologist
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had made a mistake. So the evaluation of the quality of the expert’s new final conclusion does
depend on the TMA in the report. If Cellmark made a mistake, the probative value of input from
Cellmark is not just reduced, but nonexistent. Try as we might, the Rule 703 nonhearsay logic
does not work in the context of Williams. 99
What we see, then, is that it would be too hasty to reject absolutely the plurality’s noTMA theory for basis evidence. To conclude that the Rule 703 compromise is a legal fiction
because, realistically, expert basis evidence is always disclosed for its truth goes too far. There
are some limited instances like Weber, where if we modify the basis evidence, it still remains
relevant to the expert’s analysis. Such evidence is not hearsay and can be presented without
violating the Confrontation Clause. But if the basis evidence is of no value to the prosecution
unless it is true, as in the Williams case, then it cannot elude the Clause on the ground that it is
not hearsay because it illuminates the expert’s thought process.
2. Hearsay and the Improbability Drive
The plurality’s discussion of TMA obliquely suggests another possible reason to treat the
expert’s reference to Cellmark’s laboratory findings in Williams as nonhearsay and therefore
beyond the reach of the Confrontation Clause. The plurality appears to find quite significant the
fact that Cellmark returned a profile that happened to match someone in the database who then
happened to be identified as the perpetrator by the victim in a lineup. Justice Alito wrote:
[T]here is simply no plausible explanation for how Cellmark could have produced
a DNA profile that matched Williams’ if Cellmark had tested any sample other
than the one taken from the victim. . . . Thus, the fact that the Cellmark profile
matched Williams—the very man whom the victim identified in a lineup and at
trial as her attacker—was itself striking confirmation that the sample that
Cellmark tested was the sample taken from the victim’s vaginal swabs.” 100
99

This difference between a valid use of Rule 703 and the one in Williams supports Justice Kagan’s
frustration with some of the plurality’s analysis. She wrote that:
In responding to this reasoning, the plurality confirms it. According to the plurality, basis
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Williams, 132 S Ct at 2269 n 1 (Kagan dissenting) (citations omitted).
Tenacious to a fault, however, our prosecutor might not give up on Rule 703. Like the Alito
plurality, she might say that the factfinder can rely on her expert’s belief that Cellmark produces correct
results because experts in the field reasonably rely on the fact that accredited laboratories always get
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The factfinder can, Justice Alito suggests, believe in the accuracy of Cellmark’s profile because
of the eyewitness identification of the person said to match, rather than needing to rely on
Lambatos’ assertion of her own reliance and her own belief in its trustworthiness. (This is what,
for Justice Alito, constitutes the other evidence of Cellmark’s reliability that permits Opinion 1,
discussed above, to be taken as “premise-only.”)
This “striking” coincidence about the table of alleles in the Cellmark report calls to mind
Bridges v State, 101 a well-known case about the limits of the definition of hearsay. In that case, a
man was charged with sexually molesting a minor. Among the evidence presented were
statements made by the victim to her mother and the police shortly after the incident, describing
details of the perpetrator’s house, furnishings, and location, including certain unusual details,
such as a white, fenced playhouse set back from the street directly across from the house into
which she was taken. Later, other, admissible evidence established the accuracy of the girl’s
description, including the general accuracy of the unusual and specific details she had recalled.
Additionally, in the circumstances of this case, there was absolutely no other conceivable
explanation for the young girl having ever been in this room or this house on some other
occasion, nor any other plausible way she would have known of its description. The court
determined that in this unusual situation, the girl’s out-of-court statements about where she was
molested did not constitute hearsay. Her statements were admissible, the court said, not to prove
the existence of the particular items or locations she described, but rather to prove,
circumstantially, her knowledge of these things, which tended to prove that she had in fact been
in the room, given that the room’s description and location were unequivocally established by
other, admissible evidence. 102
Bridges has been controversial among evidence analysts. Some have argued that this
evidence ought still to be viewed as hearsay and that this “circumstantial evidence of knowledge
or state of mind” has no limits and could eviscerate the hearsay rule. 103 However, the argument
that the statements are not hearsay is that, given these circumstances, including the existence of
other evidence to support the accuracy of the girl’s description, the young girl’s statements do
not need to be taken as true; rather, the very fact that she could describe such a room, proven to
exist by other evidence, suggests that she was in fact in such a room—not because she says so,
but because the chances of her being able to make up a description based on her imagination or
other sources of knowledge is massively implausible and thus extraordinarily unlikely to be the
result of mere coincidence or chicanery. So for her to be able to describe the room, with telling
and specific detail that turned out to correspond in every particular to an actual room, provides
strong circumstantial evidence that she was, in fact, in that same room, separately and apart from
her saying so. Indeed, if she had said, “Let me tell you about a room I have never seen,” and
went on to describe it in the same vivid detail, that too would provide circumstantial evidence
that she had, in fact seen it, her claim to the contrary notwithstanding.
Justice Alito did not cite Bridges, but his rationale is structurally quite similar. He
suggests that the eyewitness identification by the victim of the person whose profile was returned
by Cellmark circumstantially establishes the accuracy of Cellmark’s analysis, and hence,
Cellmark’s profile can meaningfully be mentioned by the expert for a purpose other than the
truth of its contents. But there is a difficulty. That Cellmark reported the alleles of a man
101
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subsequently identified by the victim in a line-up does provides some independent evidence of
the accuracy of its analysis, but not nearly so much as the plurality proposes. The fact of a
database match shows us that the alleles that Cellmark returned to the ISP (1) in fact matched
someone in the database (indeed, a man in the same geographical vicinity as L.J.,
notwithstanding that Cellmark handled samples from across the country); and (2) that when this
man was included in a line-up, he was the very person identified by L.J. as the perpetrator. Had
its table of alleles been plucked from the air, there most likely would not have been a match to
anyone in the database. Had Cellmark fumbled the chain of custody and analyzed the wrong rape
kit leading to a hit to the wrong man in the database, L.J. might not have identified this man in
the line-up as her assailant. So Justice Alito is correct that this does provide some circumstantial
support for the inference that Cellmark sent back the appropriate sample and engaged in an
accurate analysis.
But how strong is this evidence? To answer this, we would need to understand both the
probability of an incorrect set of alleles matching at least one person in the state database who
would not be dismissed out of hand as the possible rapist, and the probability of L.J. making an
erroneous eyewitness identification of this individual. With regard to the first issue, it should be
clear that trawling large databases creates many opportunities for even an incorrectly generated
DNA profile to match somebody. 104 Whatever that probability is, it is well above zero.
Furthermore, one should not ignore the possibility of a sample switch in the course of the
laboratory’s processing of rape kits. What if Cellmark had somehow swapped this sample sent
from the ISP containing L.J.’s vaginal swabs with another sample sent from a different Chicagoarea case? It is far from obvious that a different potential rapist would not also be in the database.
It may be fair to assume that both of these probabilities are small, but it is worth noting both that
we do not know what they are, and that they do affect the strength of the circumstantial chain of
inferences that runs from the fact of a match to the accuracy of the Cellmark report.
As for the second apparently surprising fact, it depends on the chances for an erroneous
eyewitness identification. If we thought that L.J. was extremely unlikely to make a mistake in
identifying the perpetrator, then her identification of Williams does provide substantial support
for the premise that Cellmark returned the correct sample and that it analyzed the DNA correctly.
But imagine, instead, that L.J. was not an especially careful observer, or suppose that some
aspect of this specific identification procedure was psychologically suggestive and thereby raised
the chances that any observer would pick the defendant from among the possibilities. The
opinions do not tell us how many individuals were included in the line-up. We know nothing
from the opinions about the specific procedures used. We do not know, for example, whether the
person conducting the line-up knew which member was the actual suspect, or whether the police
took other protections that have been shown to reduce the rate of erroneous identification. Some
evidence in the case suggested that L.J. may have initially identified someone else as the
perpetrator, shortly after the attack, strengthening an inference that L.J. could have been
susceptible to making an erroneous identification. 105 The substantial length of time—fourteen
months—that had passed between the attack and the line-up procedure that included Williams,
also decreases the probative value of her identification, since her memory could have faded over
that period and the perpetrator’s appearance could have changed. What if L.J. was likely to select
someone from the identification, whether the actual perpetrator was present or not? In that case,
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if there were five people in the lineup, there would be a 20 percent chance Williams would be
selected at random; if ten people in the lineup, a 10 percent chance.
Admittedly, we have no way to quantify the chances of either a laboratory slip-up or an
erroneous identification. But we can be confident that those odds, whatever they might be, are far
higher than the one-in-many-quadrillion random-match probabilities presented for Williams’
DNA. Note that the parallel to Bridges is not precise. In Bridges, the argument was that the
other evidence established the description of the room and area; the girl’s description was
therefore not hearsay, but it was admissible to demonstrate her knowledge. Without her out-ofcourt statements the prosecutor would have been missing a critical piece of the story. By
contrast, in Williams, the argument suggested by Justice Alito is that the fact of the DNA match
coupled with the eyewitness identification provides strong circumstantial evidence of Cellmark’s
accuracy, both that they examined the correct sample and that they performed their testing
procedures correctly. Therefore, the expert’s references are not hearsay because they are, in a
sense, cumulative, or unnecessary. They need not be taken as true because other evidence
establishes the same thing; hence his argument that they can be what we termed “premise-only.”
This leaves us with the question whether the coincidence of an eyewitness identification
of Williams coming in the wake of Cellmark’s report is so striking that it transforms the analyst’s
statements from hearsay into surplusage. We have our doubts. If there had been a laboratory
error in which samples were swapped, or some other inaccuracy in Cellmark’s process, there
could nonetheless be a nonnegligible possibility of an erroneous eyewitness identification. Thus,
on the facts of Williams, the probative value of the eyewitness identification as evidence of the
laboratory report’s accuracy is not as strong as the probative value of a young girl being able to
provide multiple, detailed, specific descriptions of an unusual place, as evidence that she had
been in that place at some point. Moreover, the chain of inference from the expert’s testimony
about Cellmark (taken as true) to her conclusion is far more straightforward than the
circumstantial chain the plurality opinion posits as an alternative (and that was never directly
argued at trial). Still, Justice Alito is correct that these other items do provide some quantum of
evidence supporting the accuracy of Cellmark’s results, separate from the expert’s say-so, if not
quite so overwhelming a quantum as he suggested. His argument, while perceptive, is not
entirely persuasive.
At the same time, there may be cases in which this argument would be compelling. For
instance, the circumstantial evidence would have been significantly stronger if the ISP laboratory
and Lambatos had not only looked at the defendant profile, but independently compared the
victim’s profile as reported by Cellmark to an independently-collected sample of L.J.’s profile. If
those female samples matched, that could have provided an additional, probative, circumstantial
piece of evidence suggesting the accuracy of the male DNA found in the same swab, and greatly
decreasing the chances that the eyewitness identification was a mere coincidence. It would have
made a sample swap significantly more unlikely, since it would show that the female portion of
the samples clearly were not swapped; and the accuracy of the process as applied to L.J.’s DNA
would provide circumstantial evidence of the accuracy of the process applied to the male portion
as well. Then, we would indeed have a story of remarkable coincidence comparable to Bridges.
We would know that a sample was sent to Cellmark, and a sample was returned form Cellmark
with the appropriate label, and furthermore, that the female portion of that sample correctly
matched the victim in the case, and the male portion of the sample matched someone in the
database who the victim subsequently identified as her perpetrator. While even this additional
piece of evidence would not absolutely remove all possibility of some kind of laboratory
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inaccuracy, this body of circumstantial evidence would substantially reduce the possibility of a
sample swap or some other error within Cellmark. On those facts, it would be easier to make the
argument about the strength of the circumstantial proof no longer requiring or inviting the
factfinder to take Lambatos’ testimony as evidence of the reliability of Cellmark’s analysis. Such
facts would bring this case more in line with the approach taken in Bridges.
As in the previous Section, we see that the argument that expert evidence can be offered
for a purpose other than the truth is, on occasion, plausible. In some circumstances, Justice
Alito’s “premise-only” way of understanding some expert disclosure might be credible. But to
be able to argue that expert disclosure does not also provide corroboration or bolstering of the
other evidence, information that the factfinder—perhaps especially in jury trials but possibly in
bench trials too—will be tempted to take as true, this other evidence would need to be extremely
strong. We are doubtful that the circumstantial evidence of reliability on these facts is so
overwhelmingly strong that the expert’s assertions about it were taken by the factfinder as mere
surplusage. Moreover, even if Justice Alito’s argument holds some water here, in many cases,
there will not be substantial independent evidence to support the expert’s basis. We take that
issue up in the next Section.
B. RULE 703 AND RELEVANCE

The plurality’s dogged determination to cast the expert’s testimony strictly premise-only
leads to a puzzling discussion of the need for independent evidence of the necessary facts
preceding the short-chain reasoning that starts with the alleles specified by Cellmark and
concludes with the expert’s attribution of them to Williams (Opinions 2 and 3). 106 Suppose that
L.J. had failed to make an identification of the defendant in the lineup. In that case, there would
have been no independent evidence from which a factfinder could infer the accuracy of the
alleles Cellmark reported as coming from the semen on L.J.’s swab. Would this require the
information from Cellmark to be acknowledged as being introduced for the truth of its contents,
and thus problematic under the Confrontation Clause? Justice Alito flatly denies this possibility,
asserting that “even if the record did not contain any evidence that could rationally support a
finding that Cellmark produced a scientifically reliable DNA profile based on L.J.’s vaginal
swab, that would not establish a Confrontation Clause violation.” 107 The absence of “proof that
Cellmark produced an accurate profile based on that sample,” he contends, would render
“Lambatos’ testimony regarding the match . . . irrelevant, but the Confrontation Clause . . . does
not bar the admission of irrelevant evidence, only testimonial statements by declarants who are
not subject to cross examination.” 108 Confining his vision to premise-only testimony, he states
that if there is not “independent admissible evidence to prove the foundational facts that are
essential to the relevance of the expert’s testimony, then the expert’s testimony cannot be given
any weight by the trier of fact.” 109
This position would make sense if we truly viewed Lambatos’s testimony as akin to a
hypothetical question. Suppose she had testified, “While I cannot myself speak to the accuracy of
Cellmark’s report, nor can I confirm that they returned the correct sample, if they did in fact
return the correct sample along with a correct analysis of it, then the DNA from the vaginal swab
106
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matches Sandy Williams.” In that case, Justice Alito would have been correct. First, there would
have been no Confrontation Clause problem. Second, without independent evidence of the
premises necessary to her conclusion, her opinion would have been irrelevant and not entitled to
any weight. But Lambatos did not answer a hypothetical question. Rather, she offered a
conclusion that the samples sent to Cellmark and the one the ISP took from Williams in fact
matched. In other words, she provided opinions about both the provenance and the nature of the
samples based on the report that was not introduced into evidence.
Imagine that she gave her testimony in a case with the same facts but no eyewitness
identification, either because L.J. was equivocal at the time of the line-up, or because for
whatever reason, no line-up was ever conducted. Putting the Confrontation Clause issue to one
side, Rule 703 probably would allow this testimony. Rule 703 explicitly permits an expert to rely
upon inadmissible evidence to support a conclusion, so there would be nothing wrong with
Lambatos relying upon Cellmark’s report, presuming that it is indeed reasonable for DNA
analysts to rely on profiles produced by other accredited laboratories (and it is difficult to argue
that it is not). This kind of reliance—like one doctor relying on an X-ray produced by another—
is precisely what Rule 703 permits. Under Rule 703 and most state equivalents, unlike the
method for adducing expert testimony prior to the Federal Rules, the proffering party does not
need to produce independent evidence of the foundational facts supporting the expert’s
conclusion as a precondition for admissibility of the conclusion. 110 Moreover, a factfinder is
permitted to give weight to that expert’s conclusion even if the foundational facts are never
disclosed. Indeed, Rule 703 disfavors such disclosure precisely because of the risk that if
disclosed, the factfinder will take them as true. 111 So under the conventional understanding of
Rule 703, if Lambatos’s basis evidence did not create a Confrontation Clause problem, and if her
reliance on Cellmark’s report to establish both the provenance and nature of the samples was
reasonable, her conclusions certainly would not be barred as irrelevant, even were there no other
evidence to support the accuracy of Cellmark’s DNA analysis. The whole thrust of Rule 703 is
to dispense with the common-law requirement that experts must base their conclusions on
otherwise admissible evidence—the rule creates no requirement that other evidence corroborate
the data or facts upon which an expert relies.
If Justice Alito’s intimations implying that admissible evidence supporting the expert’s
basis is a prerequisite for a factfinder to give any weight to expert opinions were applied to all
expert evidence, expert witness practice would be radically altered. Applied literally and
sweepingly, these dicta would unmake Rule 703’s provision that expert conclusions can be
admissible even when an expert’s basis evidence is not itself admissible! Surely Justice Alito did
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not mean to state that, in all situations, relevance requires independent evidence proving the truth
of the underlying facts essential to an expert’s conclusions. 112
In the wake of Williams, it would be both unfortunate and a violation of common sense if
lower courts were simply to interpret the case as standing for the idea that expert basis evidence
can be legitimately introduced for a purpose other than the truth of its contents, and hence,
because the disclosure is for a nonhearsay purpose, the Confrontation Clause is not implicated. 113
First, at least five Justices disagreed with that view. Second, even those who adhered to the
plurality opinion engaged in a set of justifications that were dramatically case-specific—that this
was a bench trial rather than a jury trial and that there was some degree of circumstantial
evidence to support the basis (albeit less than the plurality suggests). As a consequence, Williams
cannot fairly be read as legitimating a mechanical and broadbrush application of a nonhearsay
purpose under Rule 703—though we suspect that many courts will interpret it that way. Partly
that will be because of the opacity of a case that has no shared conceptual basis of a majority of
Justices for its resolution. Partly that will be because most of the lower courts have been
resistant to Crawford and its progeny and will therefore likely jump at the chance to take a more
permissive approach than the previous cases in the trilogy permitted. And partly that will be
because the no-TMA argument, although often resting on a fictional basis, is an appealing way to
treat science as special without appearing to engage in science exceptionalism for Confrontation
Clause purposes.
Under this argument, experts can remain formally subject to the Confrontation Clause’s
strictures, just like any other kind of witness. But since laboratory reports will typically satisfy
Rule 703, experts would be able to rely on them even though they are, per Melendez-Diaz,
testimonial. Note that there is no explicit, overt science exceptionalism in this approach—the
claim is that the Confrontation Clause applies to all evidence so long as it is offered for the truth
of the matter asserted. Instead, Confrontation Clause jurisprudence simply builds on Rule 703’s
own ways for treating scientific evidence differently from other kinds of evidence—both in that
experts can rely upon (and sometimes disclose) inadmissible evidence, and in that, for a set of
context-specific reasons born in the previous Confrontation Clause era, there has been
widespread acceptance of the no-TMA claim about basis evidence. Under the Williams
approach, there is no need to exempt forensic science reports completely from the Confrontation
Clause; instead, the no-TMA argument merely declaws the Clause in the forensic context.
112
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To be fair, the plurality’s arguments do have less reach than a total exemption of the sort
seemingly favored by several Justices. After Williams, it is still not permissible to introduce a
report without any expert as all, as was commonplace before Melendez-Diaz. Moreover, it
would be strained to permit the testimony of a surrogate witness with no direct involvement in
the testing, as in Bullcoming—but as much because of the limitations of the rules of evidence
that prohibit one expert from merely serving as a mouthpiece for another, 114 as because of the
Confrontation Clause itself.
III. CONFRONTING SCIENCE: THE FUTURE
The trilogy of laboratory cases marks the outer boundaries of what the Confrontation
Clause allows for evidence on the findings of laboratory scientists or technicians whom the
prosecution does not make available for cross-examination. At one pole are (a) highly formal
reports or (b) testimony from an expert with no connection to the specific laboratory analyses to
the effect that the contents of those solemn reports are true. The formal reports themselves are
inadmissible. That is the teaching of Melendez-Diaz. In addition, the testimony about the truth of
the contents is inadmissible if provided by experts unconnected to the specific test. That is the
lesson of Bullcoming. At the other pole are written reports (a) not emblazoned with seals or
attestations and (b) generated before a specific suspect or desired outcome was known to the
laboratory staff. These reports the Williams majority should find acceptable even without a
surrogate witness.
These latter outcomes follow from two unpopular theories—the William’s plurality’s noaccusation theory— and Justice Thomas’s no-formality theory. They are unpopular in that a
majority of the Williams Court expressly rejected the no-accusation theory, and only a single
Justice subscribed to the no-formality theory. Deciding more cases on theories that most of the
Court rejects seems perverse. 115 It may be the way things are for the moment, but without a more
appealing doctrine, it may constitute an unstable equilibrium.
In between these extremes is a much larger and murkier zone of hypothetical questions
(discussed in Williams), machine-generated results (mentioned in Bullcoming as possibly lying
outside the clause), and surrogate witnesses (left largely unresolved by Williams). As for
hypothetical or conditional questions, the major Williams opinions allow that the Confrontation
Clause is no barrier to asking a witness to draw expert inferences conditional on the truth of
other experts’ work. For example, a prosecutor seeking to introduce the ISP analyst’s opinion in
Williams could have posed questions that might have been answered as follows:
Q. Did you review the report that Cellmark sent back?
A. Yes.
Q. Did Cellmark report any alleles as being present in the vaginal swab and as not coming from
L.J.’s DNA?
A. Yes.
Q. Could those alleles have come from the semen that your laboratory detected in the vaginal
swabs that it shipped to Cellmark?
A. Definitely. Semen contains DNA, and it was present in the swabs.
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Q. Did you search the Illinois database of DNA profiles from known individuals to see whether
any of them were consistent with those DNA alleles that Cellmark attributed to the semen?
A. Yes.
Q. How many matches were there?
A. Only one.
Q. What is the name of that one and only matching individual?
A. Sandy Williams.
Q. Is there much of a chance of anyone else in the Chicago area besides Mr. Williams having a
similarly matching profile?
A. This profile would be expected to occur in approximately 1 in 8.7 quadrillion black, 1 in 390
quadrillion white, or 1 in 109 quadrillion Hispanic unrelated individuals.116

This line of questioning is entirely compatible with the Confrontation Clause. The
confrontation problem does not arise unless or until the prosecution presents evidence that would
allow the factfinder to accept the unstated premise that Cellmark correctly deduced the alleles of
the unknown rapist.
But skirting the confrontation problem in this way introduces the vexed evidentiary
problem known as “conditional relevance.” 117 This witness has said nothing about the truth of
Cellmark’s report that the alleles are attributable to the semen. Without proof that Cellmark’s
report is true, the expert opinion that builds on it may be irrelevant. To satisfy this relevance
requirement, the prosecution could try to introduce the Cellmark report into evidence—except
that Melendez-Diaz bars that move unless the state also produces the Cellmark analysts. Could
the prosecution establish the necessary condition through the ISP expert herself? If
knowledgeable, she could testify to how wonderful and careful Cellmark’s work always is,
giving the factfinder a reason to accept the statements in the report, and hence, the ISP expert’s
finding of a very probative match. 118 This testimony about Cellmark resolves the conditional
relevance problem, but it re-introduces the confrontation problem of proving the facts on which
the match and its associated probabilities rest without calling the witnesses to these facts. The
sole testifying expert, like the one in Bullcoming, had no involvement in Cellmark’s work, and,
as we have seen, Rule 703 offers no way out because the statements are not admitted for the noTMA purpose that sometimes, albeit rarely, legitimately applies.
To break out of this loop, the prosecution might try calling a surrogate witness who is
directly involved in at least one major step of the laboratory’s testing and is familiar with the
whole procedure. The Justices’ opinions in Williams and Bullcoming display some nonspecific
openness to the use of surrogate or synthesizing witnesses in this type of situation. When many
workers contribute to the final conclusion and some of them perform rather mechanical
116
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procedures, tying up the entire team in court seems extravagant, at least to laboratory
administrators as well as to some of the Justices. 119 And, of course, witnesses become
unavailable for reasons beyond the control of the state. But the Justices have yet to coalesce on a
workable and shared doctrine to effectuate this pragmatic compromise.
Notwithstanding the Williams plurality’s efforts to rely upon Rule 703, we believe that
this rule is more a source of confusion that a panacea for the problem of having to assemble an
entire team of witnesses from the laboratory. The rule, as originally drafted, was not directed at
the disclosure of underlying data. The rule’s purpose is to allow an expert witness to testify to a
conclusion that reasonably relies on the work of other experts without disclosing that underlying
or related work. This expert’s conclusion is the focus and gravamen of the rule. As a corollary,
the rule allows disclosure of the other experts’ out-of-court statements—but only for the limited
and often fictional purpose of helping the factfinder evaluate the quality of the testifying primary
expert’s conclusion and only when the underlying statements are unusually probative of that
reasoning. 120 In the settling dust of Williams, it seems that Justice Breyer was correct. If the
Court is to avoid a regime in which every person who comes into contact with forensic science
evidence must be produced for cross-examination, it will need to think hard about the function of
confrontation and the nature of forensic science evidence. 121
That takes us back to the still broader question that we suggested that the Court ought not
to avoid: whether there is, in fact, a satisfactory justification for giving special treatment to
forensic science evidence under the Confrontation Clause. We have seen how the Court has
danced around this question, sometimes—as in Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Melendez-Diaz—
arguing explicitly that science needs to be treated differently from other kinds of evidence, and
on other occasions—as in Justice Alito’s opinion in Williams—building on the ways that the
evidence rules already treat expert evidence differently to produce a doctrinal framework with
the effect of creating special rules for forensic science.
The rules-of-evidence approach is not only unwieldy, but it fails to come to grips with the
question of whether science testimony is meaningfully different from other testimony. Are there
119
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justifiable reasons for creating special rules in this context, and if so, what are they? On the one
hand, some Justices, like Justice Scalia, seem determined both to deny that there is a critical
difference and to assert that even if science testimony is different, it hardly matters. As he said in
Melendez-Diaz, “the analysts who swore the affidavits provided testimony against MelendezDiaz, and they are therefore subject to confrontation; we would reach the same conclusion if all
analysts always possessed the scientific acumen of Mme. Curie and the veracity of Mother
Theresa.” 122 On the other hand, some other Justices, most notably Justice Kennedy, emphasize
that forensic analysts are simply not like “ordinary” or “conventional witnesses” for myriad
reasons. 123
Notwithstanding Justice Kennedy’s emphatic use of the term, prior to Melendez-Diaz,
there was no category known as “conventional witnesses.” It is true that expert witnesses are
granted both certain kinds of special authorization under the evidence rules (such as the ability to
give opinions and to rely on inadmissible evidence), and expected to face some special forms of
regulation (such as Daubert and the provisos of Rule 702). It could even be said that “expert
witnesses” are meaningfully their own category in some respects, a category sometimes used in
relation to or in opposition to “lay witnesses,” but a well-defined counter-category of
“conventional witnesses” simply did not exist. 124 Still, he is right that there are differences.
Non-experts who appear in a criminal case are typically in court to testify about something
atypical, have percipient knowledge of either a criminal act or some past events relating to it, and
for them, testifying itself is an exceptional occurrence. By contrast, as Justice Kennedy points
out, forensic experts have standard protocols, are engaged in routine and regular activities, write
their own reports rather than being the subjects of interrogation, and are taking written
observations that are contemporaneous (or nearly so) with their scientific observations. These
differences, in his view, should make a difference.
Although both Crawford and Melendez-Diaz emphasize that the Confrontation Clause is not
supposed to be about reliability—even the evidence of saints is subject to its strictures—
reliability still lurks in these opinions. And understandably so. First, it is hard to understand
what the Confrontation Clause is for, if not reliability. It might be fair enough to say that a
judicial determination of reliability ought not to deprive the factfinder of confrontation as a
method for its own independent assessment of reliability, but it is difficult to understand the
Confrontation Clause’s purpose wholly disconnected from the idea of reliability. (Indeed, Justice
Scalia recognizes as much, although he reads the Confrontation Clause as a procedural
mechanism that tends toward greater reliability rather than a substantive check). Moreover,
when it comes to experts, the Daubert trilogy and its innumerable progeny in the lower courts
have made reliability into the clear touchstone for the evaluation of scientific evidence, the
evidentiary keyword that governs its assessment by the court. As Justice Blackmun wrote in
Daubert, “under the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or
evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.” 125
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Like most of the Justices in the science confrontation trilogy, we are dancing around the
question of whether science is different. The difficulty is that expert witnesses, including
forensic analysts, are neither entirely ordinary witnesses nor entirely unlike ordinary witnesses.
Like ordinary lay witnesses, they can misperceive, make mistakes, misinterpret. They can be
subject to cognitive biases. They can lie, mischaracterize, or overstate. As Justice Scalia
recognizes,
Nor is it evident that what respondent calls "neutral scientific testing" is as neutral or as reliable
as respondent suggests. Forensic evidence is not uniquely immune from the risk of manipulation.
According to a recent study conducted under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences,
"[t]he majority of [laboratories producing forensic evidence] are administered by law
enforcement agencies, such as police departments, where the laboratory administrator reports to
the head of the agency." And "[b]ecause forensic scientists often are driven in their work by a
need to answer a particular question related to the issues of a particular case, they sometimes face
pressure to sacrifice appropriate methodology for the sake of expediency." A forensic analyst
responding to a request from a law enforcement official may feel pressure—or have an
incentive—to alter the evidence in a manner favorable to the prosecution.126

But it is also true, as the dissent in Bullcoming explains, that forensic science reports are often
prepared by experienced technicians in laboratories that follow professional norms and scientific
protocols. In addition to the constitutional right to call witnesses in his own defense, the
defendant in this case was already protected by checks on potential prosecutorial abuse such as
free retesting for defendants; result-blind issuance of reports; testing by an independent agency;
routine processes performed en masse, which reduce opportunities for targeted bias; and labs
operating pursuant to scientific and professional norms and oversight.”127

We will not here succeed in resolving to what degree forensic science witnesses are
different from ordinary ones. But we do wish to suggest one extremely important feature of
most science that has implications for how we think about science under the Confrontation
Clause and that, as Justice Breyer recognized in Williams, will need to be confronted explicitly.
In thinking about why scientific evidence might warrant some limited special treatment, it seems
to us that the most important feature of science is that it is a collective, rather than an individual
enterprise. 128 Most scientific experiments, research project, analyses and tests are not carried out
by a single individuals acting in isolation. 129 Certainly one can find instances of an individual
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experiment conducted by a scientist working alone (though even this solo scientist must rely on
the contributions of others—purchasing reagents or laboratory equipment that embodies the
expertise of others, or building on experimental results conducted by others). But most scientists
simply do not operate solo. This is true across virtually all domains of science—from the high
energy physics experiment that involves hundreds or even thousands of collaborators, to the
social psychology experiment conducted by a far smaller team. And it is also true of forensic
science test procedures.
This reality is not lost on the Justices struggling with forensic science and the
Confrontation Clause. In Williams, Justice Breyer wrote, “Experts—especially laboratory
experts—regularly rely on the technical statements and results of other experts to form their own
opinions. The reality of the matter is that the introduction of a laboratory report involves layer
upon layer of technical statements (express or implied) made by one expert and relied upon by
another.” 130 As practiced in most laboratories, DNA analysis, for example, is a collaborative
endeavor, involving multiple analysts, each of whom conducts one (or more steps) that
subsequent analysis relies upon. Indeed Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion included an
appendix describing, flow-chart style, the many different steps that may be taken by as many as a
dozen different analysts, conducting a singular regular DNA profile comparison. 131 Must all of
them testify in every case? Can it really be that the Confrontation Clause requires “turtles all the
way down” 132? Are we doomed to face a regress of experts, where each has relied upon the one
before, who now must also testify?
By contrast, a “conventional witness,” to borrow Justice Kennedy’s nomenclature, does
not usually testify about knowledge produced through such a collective, interconnected process.
Usually, such a witness testifies to firsthand, personal observations. While these may include the
statements of others—which would be hearsay if introduced for their truth—this witness’
testimony, beliefs, and observations typically do not intrinsically depend on a complex web of
trusted activities conducted by others, or at least not to the same degree. Typically, a
“conventional witness” may have seen or observed something that has probative value only in
connection with other evidence. To borrow the evidentiary truism, a brick is not a wall; a given
witness’s testimony may be merely a modest brick that has to be integrated with other evidence
to be persuasive on any matter of import to the case. But it is the factfinder who is asked to
make these links, not the witness. When the conventional witness testifies to “bricks” within his
first-hand knowledge, his knowledge does not depend on the other bricks in the same way that an
expert’s often does. To be sure, outside of the courtroom, he might think of himself as having
knowledge of some of these other “bricks” as well, based on hunch, speculation, inference, or the
testimony of others. But in court, his testimony is limited, as much as is practicable, to the
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matters that do not depend on factual knowledge that stems from sources outside his own
observation. 133
By contrast, the knowledge claims of forensic science witnesses are, intrinsically,
strongly interlinked with the actions and knowledge-production of others. Expert opinions and
conclusions, inevitably and necessarily, require reliance on materials produced by others, data
provided by others, and judgments and opinions reached by others. It is not an exaggeration to
say that the knowledge that is produced through the exercise of expertise is inherently collective
knowledge. It requires reliance on what others have done and what others know. This, of
course, is precisely why Rule 703 permits experts, unlike lay witnesses, to rely on data and
materials provided by others in forming their own conclusions. Doing so is part of what it means
to engage in complex inference and knowledge production. Experts, in the course of their daily
work, are engaged in a form of “collective” or “distributed cognition,” in which they produce
knowledge together that would not be available to any one of them standing alone. The
knowledge is distributed across a group of experts, rather than being held by any single
individual. 134 These individuals produce knowledge collaboratively, that is not truly held by any
one of them alone. In a sense, the knowledge belongs to the network rather the individual.
Collaborators create formal or informal procedures and mechanisms that both generate and rely
upon trust, but there is inevitably an “epistemic dependence” 135 upon one another.
Returning to the Confrontation Clause conundrums, much of the time, the materials, data,
and opinions upon which an expert relies, or the other individuals and elements within the
expert’s network of distributed cognition, will not itself be testimonial. The operator of a
breathalyzer relies upon a machine he himself likely only partly understands—enormous
technical knowledge is literally built into it. But that knowledge is not testimonial under any of
the Court’s definitions. The same goes for a forensic pathologist who relies on the deceased’s
medical records when ascertaining the cause of death. Those medical records are part of the
forensic pathologist’s basis, but they are not themselves testimonial. So for many kinds of
scientific evidence, distributed cognition does directly raise Confrontation Clause problems.
Because of the relatively limited definition of the testimonial, it would be theoretically
possible to require each and every testimonial declarant within a forensic science analysis to
testify. There is no inherent obstacle besides time and money. All of the roughly dozen analysts
who participated in a given DNA extraction and comparison process could come to court to
133
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describe what they did in turn. This might be highly impractical, but it is possible. 136
Nonetheless, virtually no one who has thought about the intersection of forensic science and the
Confrontation Clause thinks this makes sense. Even Justice Scalia, who is perhaps prepared to
go furthest down that path, does not wish to go quite so far. He wrote in Melendez-Diaz,
Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, we do not hold, and it is not the case, that anyone whose
testimony may be relevant in establishing the chain of custody, authenticity of the sample, or
accuracy of the testing device, must appear in person as part of the prosecution's case. While the
dissent is correct that "[i]t is the obligation of the prosecution to establish the chain of custody,"
this does not mean that everyone who laid hands on the evidence must be called. As stated in the
dissent's own quotation, "gaps in the chain [of custody] normally go to the weight of the evidence
rather than its admissibility." It is up to the prosecution to decide what steps in the chain of
custody are so crucial as to require evidence; but what testimony is introduced must (if the
defendant objects) be introduced live.137

Justice Scalia tries to escape from the “turtles all the way down” problem by distinguishing chain
of custody evidence from substantive analysis, but as the dissent points out, this distinction does
not actually provide much assistance. Take the testimony about the chemical makeup of a drug,
in Melendez-Diaz. Justice Scalia implies that the person who establishes the accuracy of the
testing device is not required, But why not? Is that not a prerequisite to being able to be
confident about the accuracy of the result? 138 Arguably the person who interpreted the result is
making the most central bottom line judgment relevant to the defendant. Is this individual
therefore the only one who needs testify? What if the technician who prepared the sample
somehow contaminated it? Should that technician be required to testify as well? None of these
technicians is merely engaged in documenting a chain of custody. They are all taking steps that
contribute to the final conclusion about the chemical composition of the substance at issue. They
are, in other words, engaged in distributive cognition.
Thus, following to its logical conclusion the claim that testimonial evidence must be
presented live would lead to the technically possible, but worrisomely expensive and inefficient
position, that every testimonial link in the distributed cognitive chain of experts must be forged
with a corresponding witness in court.
At the same time, however, understanding that distributed cognition and epistemic
deference are part and parcel of what it means to be doing science may help justify a partial
retreat from this unattractive result. This recognition could inform a coherent and constructive
analysis of whether, when, and to what degree, a form of science exceptionalism in the
Confrontation Clause might be warranted. Recognizing that science is a collective mechanism
for knowledge production, a process of distributed rather than individual cognition, and a set of
methods that rely upon both skepticism and epistemic dependence should matter, at least to a
limited degree. In making this claim, we appreciate that the legal system has its own methods
for adducing knowledge. The procedures of science are not, ipso facto, adequate for legal
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purposes. The law is free to develop its own rules and requirements—even to the extent of
requiring each and every forensic analyst to appear in court. Assertions of dire consequences
and an end to forensic testing such as those made by New York City’s Chief Medical
Examiner 139 might not sway judges, who might instead expect laboratories to consolidate tasks
to require fewer analysts in each case. Surely, if pressed, laboratories could reduce the number
of analysts involved in some tests. For example, a DNA analysis and comparison could revert to
a process involving, say, three technicians and analysts, not twelve or more. But if we see
distributed cognition as a defining feature of science, we recognize that this dilemma cannot—
and indeed probably should not—be eliminated by expecting laboratories to restructure in
fundamental ways to reduce or eliminated the collective nature of the knowledge produced. 140
Given that the courtroom is a central operating theater for forensic science, draconian
Confrontation Clause rules might well motivate laboratories to make such modifications. But if
these modifications took laboratories in directions inconsistent with the practices of science more
generally, it is far from clear that these would be positive developments. The general problem of
forensic science has been inadequate incorporation of the norms and practices that govern
scientific knowledge production in other settings. Creating incentives to reduce the degree of
distributed cognition would push in the opposite direction. Thus, in the name of confrontation
values, which, even if not about reliability per se, are intended as protections enhancing the
reliability of evidence, forensic laboratories might instead develop practices that decreased
accuracy, transparency, and the creation of a research culture. 141 Recognizing the valuable
dimensions of the collective aspects of science, suggests that this difficulty of the potential
expert witness regress cannot and should not be eliminated by expecting laboratories to change
their practices. Asking for scientific knowledge to look like that of “conventional witnesses” in
this respect is not a viable long-term solution.
Recognizing that there is a certain structural mismatch between the atomized conception
of knowledge-provision that undergirds our approach to “conventional witnesses,” and the
operation of science, may invite openness to some modifications to the Confrontation Clause
with respect to expert witnesses. 142 At the same time, the fact that scientific knowledge is, in
some ways, different from lay knowledge, does not justify abandoning the values underlying the
Confrontation Clause altogether, nor treating science as if it is self-authorizing or infallible, for
surely it is neither one. The question is whether the epistemic values of the Confrontation Clause
can be melded with the epistemic realities at work in modern science.
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We believe there is potential for such compromises. We conclude by briefly offering
possible suggestions for such compromises—but we are less wedded to the particulars than to the
larger points that (1) the right approach to the Confrontation Clause and forensic science is to ask
whether, how, and to what extent science exceptionalism is warranted; and (2) to suggest that the
key difference that Confrontation Clause jurisprudence needs to recognize and account for is that
science is a collective phenomenon that both produces distributed knowledge and permits, and
indeed requires, a certain bounded degree of epistemic deference to the findings of others.
What, then, might these compromises look like? We have mentioned that scientific
practices involve a certain degree of trust, epistemic dependence, and deference. But they also
often operate through procedures and modes of communication designed to enhance this trust
and warrant this deference. Describing the origins of modern science in Leviathan and the Air
Pump, Steven Shapin and Steven Shaffer described how Robert Boyle’s scientific papers about
experiments were self-consciously written to make the scientist readers of them into ‘virtual
witnesses.” 143 His hope was that by reading these immensely and self-consciously detailed
accounts, complete with relevant visual depictions, other scientists could almost believe they
were present at the experiment itself. Documentation that is both detailed and standardized is a
“literary technology” that aids both epistemic deference and distributed cognition. Boyle did not
simply ask his fellow scientists to believe him, or to defer to his authority—by documenting in
vivid detail what he had done, he transmitted his knowledge partially to those readers sufficiently
expert to understand, and thereby enhanced his authority and claims to being believed. 144
A focus on the adequacy of documentation might be one place to bridge the
Confrontation Clause and the practices of experts. For example, we have argued elsewhere that
surrogate witnesses should not generally be permitted in lieu of the actual analysis, ẚ la
Bullcoming, but that in certain narrow circumstances, they should be deemed permissible. 145
When the original analyst is unavailable through no fault of the state; when retesting of the
evidence specimen is not possible, and when the documentation is sufficiently detailed to permit
the surrogate to exercise independent judgment, we have suggested that surrogate witnesses
should be allowed. This narrow compromise, we believe, respects both the Confrontation Clause
and the processes of science. It is a second-best solution grounded on necessity (hence the
requirement for unavailability, parallel to the second-best solution offered in Crawford itself of
using a witness’ prior testimony upon a showing of both unavailability and a prior opportunity to
cross-examine). Given the confrontation value placed on having witnesses who were first-hand
participants to the forensic process, if retesting is possible, that should be done rather than using
a surrogate with no involvement. But if retesting is not possible, then the adequacy of
documentation of the original test—a long-standing scientific strategy for enhancing
communication across members of a distributed knowledge network—should permit the use of a
surrogate witness who bases his conclusions on the original report coupled with the independent
exercise of some degree of his own expertise. To be sure, the surrogate is still relying on the
testimonial report. But he is also engaging in distributed knowledge-production, in ways
commonplace within the scientific enterprise.
Assuming that they are all available, which members of a distributed knowledge network
must testify to satisfy the Confrontation Clause? This framework suggests no simple answer to
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this question, but it is nonetheless of some assistance. For no one at all to testify live—as in
Melendez-Diaz—violates the Confrontation Clause’s strong preference for live testimony. To
have everyone involved testify is not only expensive, but it fails to take seriously the collective
epistemic aspect of scientific evidence. It treats experts as if they were atomized knowledgeproducers instead of participants in a collective process that permits them a degree of deference,
dependence, trust and reliance upon each other’s findings. How exactly to “split the baby” is not
obvious—should the focus be on the expert who exercised the greatest degree of independent
judgment? Should the focus be on the expert at the top of the inferential chain who made the
final interpretations and hence was in a position to describe, if not to warrant, the contributions
that preceded his own? Should the inquiry be into which witnesses are “central” and which
“peripheral,” if such categories can be delineated?
We recognize that any determination along these lines will be somewhat arbitrary. We
cannot truly argue that recognizing the collective nature of scientific knowledge yields a
particular or simple answer. But it does suggest that permitting scientists to engage in some
degree of epistemic deference toward the results of their collaborators is, in essence, to permit
them to behave like scientists. Again, robust documentation norms may provide a partial
palliative. More generally, this framework suggests that even though there may not be one right
answer to the line-drawing question, drawing the line some reasonable way is indeed justified,
especially when coupled with robust documentation requirements that can improve the degree of
justification for epistemic deference by other experts participating in the test process.
Finally, we come back to the facts of Williams. As we have indicated in great detail, we
do not think that Justice Alito’s no-TMA argument succeeds on the facts of the case, although
we do think that on occasion, this argument could work. Could the outcome in Williams have
been justified on alternative grounds? The ISP’s expert witness was engaged in a mixture of
independent judgment and expertise and epistemic deference. She believed the Cellmark report
not because she had participated in the analysis, but because it was the report of an accredited
laboratory that she believed appropriate to trust unless provided with some reason not to, and no
such reason was present in the case. We might reasonably say that the technicians at the ISP and
the technicians at Cellmark were engaged in collective knowledge-production, an example of
distributed cognition.
We grant that this is a plausible argument. Frankly, we would have preferred to see the
Court take up Justice Breyer’s challenge and face directly this version of the “who must testify”
question. Our view is that the better line drawing would have been to require someone from
Cellmark to testify in addition to the witnesses from ISP. While it is certainly possible to draw a
large circle of “collective cognition,” around both laboratories at once, the two laboratories,
hundreds of miles apart, have different protocols, different standard practices, and different
internal cultures. The testifying witness knew nothing about these specific protocols. As Justice
Kagan points out, the ISP analyst “had no knowledge at all of Cellmark’s operations. Indeed, for
all the record discloses, she may never have set foot in Cellmark’s laboratory.” 146 While the
testifying expert’s reliance may have been warranted from a scientific perspective, the high value
placed by the Confrontation Clause’s on live testimony for any testimonial statements militates,
we think, in favor of requiring someone from Cellmark to testify as well. We do recognize,
however, that this conclusion is a judgment call, and that efforts to balance confrontation values
with a sensitivity to what is distinctive about science might permit someone else to accept our
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general framework but reach a different conclusion about what was required under Williams’
facts.
We end, therefore, by returning to where we began. We have tried to show how the issue
of science exceptionalism pervades the new expert evidence trilogy. We do not believe that the
Court will achieve a satisfying, persuasive, and workable approach until it forthrightly confronts
the question of whether science is special in ways that warrant distinctive treatment under the
Confrontation Clause. We have tried to show that this issue of science exceptionalism has been
lurking within the various opinions in the trilogy—most explicitly in Justice Kennedy’s dissent
in Melendez-Diaz, but present to some degree throughout the trilogy.
We believe that the effort to resolve Williams through Rule 703 and the no-TMA
argument was a wrong turn. Most of the time, as the dissent in Williams recognized, the no-TMA
argument requires implausible mental gymnastics and operates as a legal fiction. There are some
limited situations in which expert basis evidence might legitimately be said to be introduced for a
purpose other than its truth, but Williams does not present one. In Williams, there is some
circumstantial evidence to provide independent support for the Cellmark reports’ reliability, but
this argument is less persuasive than Justice Alito believed. More fundamentally, it hardly
provides a general Rule 703 exception in the Confrontation Clause setting, because most of the
time, no such independent basis will be present.
At the same time, we believe that the issue lurking behind, and in good part motivating
Rule 703—the fact that experts almost inevitably do rely on information provided by others—is
precisely what might justify a certain degree of special treatment of scientific evidence under the
Confrontation Clause. When thinking about how to approach the Confrontation Clause, the
distinctive feature of science that requires focused attention is that it is a collective enterprise: it
produces distributed knowledge located across individuals rather than held by someone standing
alone, and that its participants engage in epistemic deference, deference that is supported by
careful documentation. Only by confronting what these aspects of science ought to mean for the
operation of the Confrontation Clause will the Court be able to develop an approach to this
thorny set of issues that adequately respects both Confrontation Clause values and the practices
of science.
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